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1. Introduction 
 Bribery is increasingly becoming an important concern for governments and companies. Over 
the past 30 years, large multinational firms like Siemens, BAE Systems, Hyundai, Lockheed Martin, and 
Halliburton have all been reported to have bribed government officials worldwide. The Dow Jones State 
of Anti-Corruption Survey (2011) reports that over 40% of companies claim to have lost business to 
competitors that won contracts using bribes. In a 2006 survey, 11% of OECD firms reported that “firms 
like theirs” bribe in other OECD countries, and 26% reported bribery in developing countries (D’Souza 
and Kaufmann, 2013).  
However, despite this wide interest, there is very little evidence on what determines the benefits 
that these firms receive from bribery. Understanding what drives these benefits is an important first step 
in understanding why some firms continue to bribe despite increased anti-corruption enforcement in 
recent years. Our empirical understanding of the bribery phenomenon based on direct evidence at the 
firm level, is very limited. Bribery is illegal and undisclosed and there is no data to compare bribing and 
non-bribing firms. Most of the academic literature has therefore, examined bribery at the macro level. 
Using proxies for the extent or frequency of bribery at the country level, the studies have focused on the 
determinants of bribery, and its impact on the country’s economic development.1 These proxies typically 
rely on evidence derived from questionnaires, surveys, and clinical studies, which are better at capturing 
corruption perceptions at an aggregate level.2  
In this paper, we ask a micro-level research question: Conditional on the firm having chosen to 
bribe, which factors determine the benefits shareholders receive in return (the return on bribery)? Two 
recent studies have attempted to estimate the magnitude of the benefits that firms derive from bribery at 
 
1 See Bardhan (1997), Jain (2001), Svensson (2005), or Olken and Pande (2012) for surveys.  
2 For example, Svensson (2003) and Fisman and Svensson (2007) analyze survey data from small firms in Uganda, Hellman, 
Jones, and Kaufmann (2002) and D’Souza and Kaufmann (2013) analyze international survey evidence, and McMillan and 
Zoido (2004) and Shleifer and Vishny (1993) discuss clinical evidence. 
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the firm level. Zeume (2017) documents that firms operating in corrupt countries experienced a 
significant drop in value when the United Kingdom (U.K.) Bribery Act was adopted. Karpoff, Lee, and 
Martin (2017) employ a methodology similar to ours in order to derive point estimates of the benefits to 
bribery. Our main difference with these studies is that our data allows us to focus on analyzing the cross-
sectional determinants of the benefits that firms receive from bribery across the world (rather than 
focusing on obtaining average point estimates only). Our sample is larger, it includes domestic as well 
as foreign bribes (when domestic bribes are not included in the previous studies), and it includes a larger 
number of bribe-paying and bribe-taking countries, over a significantly longer time period.3 These 
differences in the sample size and composition allow us to analyze the impact of a large set of contract, 
firm, government official, and country-level institutional characteristics on the cross-sectional 
differences of the benefits that firms receive from bribery. 
Existing inferences from most of the literature on corruption are based on survey evidence or 
anecdotes. Table 1 lists a number of previous theoretical and empirical studies that derive hypotheses on 
cross-sectional differences of the magnitude of the benefits that firms receive. As the table shows, little 
direct empirical evidence exists for most of these predictions, which are largely based on theoretical 
models or conjectures, survey or anecdotal evidence. However, recent research highlights potential 
problems with self-reported survey evidence, both in general (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001), and 
more specifically with the indices used to measure corruption (Knack, 2006; Donchev and Ujhelyi, 2014; 
Olken, 2009; Persily and Lammie, 2004; Abramo, 2008).  
 
3 A few other studies analyze firm-level data but do not analyze the benefits that firms receive. Some studies focus on the 
impact on firm value of the revelation of the bribery on stock prices in the U.S. (Smith, Stettler, and Beedles, 1984) and on 
leverage in China (Fan, Rui, and Zhao, 2008). Healy and Serafeim (2016) examine whether firms’ self-reported anticorruption 
efforts correlate with subsequent involvement in corruption activity in press reports or sales growth in highly corrupt 
geographic segments. Siegel and Jeong (2018) analyze two court cases against South Korean presidents and find that high-
status firms that have experienced financial difficulties are more likely to bribe in order to gain a competitive advantage. 
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In our paper, we analyze a hand-collected sample of 195 prominent bribery cases, involving 131 
publicly listed firms from 24 stock markets, that have been reported to have bribed government officials 
in 60 countries worldwide, and were detected during 1975-2015. We analyze actual documented bribery 
incidents, and we focus on the initial date of award of the contract for which the bribe was paid. Though 
our sample is based on firms that have ex post been detected bribing, this does not imply that our results 
are not generalizable to firms that pay bribes but have not been detected. In a majority of cases, the 
revelation of bribery in our sample firms arose from investigation of the government official involved 
(rather than the firm) following a government or regime change in the bribe-taking country or other 
exogenous changes in enforcement, and started in a foreign country different from the firm’s country of 
origin. Hence, the detection typically appears unrelated to the characteristics of the firms in our sample.  
To illustrate our empirical methodology, consider the example of BAe Systems PLC, a major 
UK defense company, which was reported to have paid the equivalent of $179 million (7% of the contract 
value) as a bribe to the special adviser of the South African Defense Minister in order to be awarded a 
$2.5 billion fighter aircraft contract (see Figure 1). We trace back newspaper reports related to the 
original award of the contract to BAe and find three relevant announcement dates related to this deal. 
Around these dates, BAe earned three-day market-adjusted excess returns of +6.1%, +7.6%, and −1.9% 
respectively, representing a total increase in its (market-adjusted) stock market capitalization of $1,484 
million (estimated as the market-adjusted excess return times the firm’s market capitalization two days 
before each event date, summed over all three dates pertaining to the same contract). The benefits that 
shareholders received represent 89.2% of the total rents generated by the transaction (where the total 
rents are the sum of the increase in the firm’s market capitalization and the bribe payment).4 The absolute 
 
4 Rents earned by the firm are typically defined as benefits received for assets formed by creating official privilege over 
natural opportunities (e.g., patents). In this paper, we define rents as the sum of the bribe payment plus the larger of the gross 
benefit or zero. 
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value of the net benefit (the increase in the bribing firm’s market capitalization minus the bribe payment), 
essentially the NPV of the bribe, is $1,484 million -$179 million = $1,305 million. Simply put, BAe 
shareholders received $8.3 of benefits per dollar of bribe it paid (the ratio of the increase in market 
capitalization divided by the bribe payment). While this methodology is simple and intuitive, we also 
provide a series of comparisons and robustness tests to show that measuring the benefits in this fashion 
does not introduce a significant bias in our analysis relative to the methodology of Karpoff, Lee, and 
Martin (2017). 
The mean (median) bribe in our sample is $21 ($4) million (all figures adjusted to constant 2005 
US$), representing 4.6% (2.6%) of the size of the project, and transfers 44.6% (10.7%) of the rents from 
the contract to the bribing firm. The mean NPV of the bribe is $122 million, although this is largely 
driven by outliers. For the median firm, the NPV of a bribe payment is close to zero. When the bribe is 
eventually revealed in the popular press, the average firm earns 3-day abnormal returns of –1.9%, a 
number that is much larger economically than Zeume (2017) but similar to Karpoff, Lee, and Martin 
(2017).5  
The theoretical and empirical literature (see Table 1) has identified 11 broad determinants of the 
benefits that firms receive from bribing. These determinants are related to the characteristics of the 
project for which the bribe was paid, the firm paying the bribe, the government official receiving the 
bribe, and the external environment where the firm and the government official operate. A few of these 
studies derive predictions for the size of bribes, taking the level of benefits from the contract as given. 
A larger bribe payment would hence imply a smaller after-bribe (net) benefit available for the firm to 
 
5 Zeume (2017) estimates that an increase of one standard deviation in corruption exposure (equivalent to comparing a firm 
with seven subsidiaries in the UK to a firm with six subsidiaries in the UK and one in Russia) is associated with a -0.73% 
reduction in firm value, equivalent to a $12.9 mil loss in market capitalization. This effect is much smaller than the average 
value losses associated with the disclosure of real bribery cases both in our sample and in the sample analyzed by Karpoff, 
Lee, and Martin (2017).  
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capture. In our context, these predictions would imply that bribe size is inversely related to the benefits 
the firm earns, net of the bribe payment amount.  
We find the most robust support for two of the 11 hypotheses identified in the prior literature. 
First, previous studies directly relate the size of rents from the contract to the amount paid in bribes. 
Jeong and Weiner (2011) analyze data from the United Nations’ oil-for-food program and find that larger 
bribes were associated with larger rents at the contract level. Our estimates using cross-sectional 
regressions indicate that a $1 increase in the size of the bribe is associated with a $4-9 increase in the 
benefits that firms receive (a marginal effect). 
The second most important factor that we identify is related to information disclosure. Rasmusen 
and Ramseyer (1994) develop a theoretical model to suggest that bribe payments are larger (and therefore 
benefits are smaller) when voters are better informed. Better informed voters have a higher tendency to 
reject incumbents if they are suspected of taking bribes and so, given a certain level of benefits, bribe 
payments to politicians need to be larger to compensate them for losing control if caught. McMillan and 
Zoido (2004) suggest that the strongest check on the government’s power in Peru was the news media.6 
We find that a measure of public disclosure of politicians’ sources of income in the bribe-taking country 
is negatively related to the NPV of the bribe. Consistent with the prior literature, this effect is driven by 
democratic countries. We find no significant results for non-democratic countries where disclosure 
appears not to matter for governments that do not face elections and cannot be removed from power.  
We find qualified support (in some but not all specifications) for four additional hypotheses. The 
first of these relates to government efficiency (proxied by regulatory burdens). Early literature on bribery 
suggest that by paying bribes, efficient firms lower the transaction costs they would incur if they instead 
 
6 In related studies, publicity reduced the amount of funds that district government officials siphoned off government grants 
for schools in Uganda (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004; 2005). 
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complied with bureaucratic regulations, thus “greasing the wheels of bureaucracy”.7 However, later 
studies take a more negative view, arguing that the “grabbing hand” of government extracts rents from 
firms, so that bribery acts as “sand in the machine” by inducing administrative delays and distorting 
resource allocations.8 In our specifications, we use the customs burden as our main explanatory variable 
to proxy for regulatory burdens. Our results are more in line with the second view. We find that the 
operating performance of our sample firms is similar on most dimensions to a matched control group of 
firms without bribery incidents. Bribing firms do not appear to be the most efficient firms lowering 
transaction costs by bribery. Our results also suggest that regulatory burdens are inversely related to the 
NPV of the bribes.  
The next three hypotheses for which we find some (but limited) support are legal enforcement, 
anti-corruption enforcement and the level of corruption perceptions in the bribe-taking country. Zeume 
(2017) documents that firms operating in corrupt countries experienced a significant drop in value when 
the U.K. Bribery Act was adopted in 2010. D’Souza and Kaufmann (2013) hypothesize an inverse 
relationship between levels of voice and accountability, press freedom, transparency, the rule of law, 
anti-corruption enforcement and benefits that firms obtain by paying bribes. We find that the lack of 
legal efficiency is associated with larger benefits for the bribing firms. In addition, the level of corruption 
perceptions is weakly associated with larger benefits in non-democratic countries. However, we also 
find conflicting evidence on whether being subject to either the provisions of the United States (U.S.) 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) or to the provisions of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, or 
paying domestic bribes that violate domestic laws, leads to lower bribe NPV.  
 
7 See Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968; Lui, 1985; or Beck and Maher, 1986 
8 See Bhagwati, Brecher, and Srinivasan, 1984; Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1991; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; 1994; 1998; 
Mauro, 1995; Keefer and Knack, 1995; Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Ades and Di Tella, 1997; Mauro, 1997; Tanzi and Davoodi, 
1997; Johnson, Kauffman, and Shleifer, 1997; Lambsdorff, 1999; Friedman, Johnson, Kauffman, and Zoido-Lobaton, 2000; 
Kaufmann and Wei, 2000; Wei, 2000; Bertrand, Djankov, Hanna, and Mullainathan, 2007; Gonzales, Lopez-Cordova, and 
Valladares, 2007; or Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2014. 
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Finally, we find no support for the remaining five factors. First, using survey data from Ugandan 
firms, Svensson (2003) hypothesizes that the firm’s ability to pay (proxied by current and expected future 
profitability) is a determinant of the variation in the benefits that firms receive by paying bribes. However, 
we do not find that abnormal ROE (relative to a matched control sample) or other performance measures 
are significantly related to the benefits that firms derive from bribes. 
Second, clinical evidence suggests that politicians with greater hold-up power (less competition 
between government officials) receive a larger share of the rents from corruption, thus leaving smaller 
net benefits to firms. McMillan and Zoido (2004) discuss how the head of Peru’s national intelligence 
service, Montesinos, paid larger bribes to TV stations in order to obtain favorable news reports on the 
government of President Fujimori. Each TV station had a large hold-up power on the government, 
because even one station could undo the government’s line with unfavorable coverage. This hypothesis 
suggests that politicians with larger hold-up power may capture a larger slice of the rents from corrupt 
contracts, leaving less benefits for the bribing firms. Instead, in some (but not all) of our specifications, 
we find that firms that bribe politicians with greater hold-up power (heads of state, presidents, and prime 
ministers) receive larger benefits as a result. This finding, which is stronger in non-democratic countries, 
may reflect the fact that high-ranking politicians can also deliver contracts to firms with higher 
probability (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).  
The third hypothesis for which we find no empirical support is related to firm competition for the 
contract. The theoretical effect of firm competition on the benefits that firms derive from bribes is 
ambiguous (Rasmusen and Ramseyer, 1994; Bardhan, 1997; Svensson, 2005; D’Souza and Kaufmann, 
2013). Less competition implies that firms might be able to obtain higher rents. However, contracts with 
relatively low values might also attract little competition. We do not find that firms that bribe in order to 
win contracts through competitive bidding receive lower benefits. Instead, we find that firms that obtain 
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favors without facing competition from other bidders (such as licenses, regulatory exemptions, tax 
benefits, and judicial favors) are the ones who obtain lower benefits from these bribes, perhaps because 
the contracts are relatively low value to begin with. 
The fourth hypothesis for which we find no support is that firms that bribe government officials 
in democratic countries receive larger benefits. There is a voluminous literature on the economics of 
public choice trying to explain the so-called “Tullock paradox” (Tullock, 1990). The paradox 
hypothesizes that democratically elected government officials allegedly receive very small bribes 
relative to the benefits that firms derive. Rasmusen and Ramseyer (1994) also note that democratic 
politicians sell their votes for bribes that are trivial in value compared to the rents that they bestow to the 
bribing firm.9 Bombardini and Trebbi (2011) suggest that in democratic societies, the ability of the firm 
to provide alternative benefits to the politician (such as voter support) may reduce the magnitude of 
monetary bribes, while Chamon and Kaplan (2013) reconcile conflicting evidence in the literature about 
this paradox by recognizing the use of out-of-equilibrium threats (that firms may contribute to 
opponents). However, democracy scores are unrelated to the NPVs of the bribes in our study.  
Finally, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) hypothesize that firms should receive lower benefits from 
complex projects (such as defense, construction, or engineering infrastructure), which offer more 
opportunities to government officials to conceal corruption, and hence appropriate a larger share of the 
rents themselves. We find no support for this hypothesis either (with the exception of one specification 
in non-democratic countries).  
Overall, our paper contributes to the literature on corruption by analyzing direct data on the 
determinants of the benefits that firms receive from large-scale bribery, for which there is little evidence. 
 
9 They offer numerous potential explanations for this phenomenon that are related to the risks involved in assembling a 
bribing coalition, competition between legislators driving down the magnitude of the bribes, the ability of legislators to renege 
on the deal, and the externalities imposed on other legislators when they are unable to collude with each other. 
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Our analysis is similar to the literature on the determinants of accounting fraud, which also analyzes only 
the observable samples of firms that have been detected committing accounting irregularities (see, for 
example, Davidson, Dey, and Smith, 2015). Our approach provides an alternative framework that is 
different from the survey-based methodology used in most prior literature. Since corruption activity is 
secret, Table 1 reveals that a lot of our current understanding of corruption is based on data with limited 
generalizability (self-reported survey evidence and anecdotal/clinical evidence which rely on details of 
a handful of detected cases). Our analysis provides at least a different yardstick for measuring the validity 
of some of these conjectures in prior literature. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and methodology. 
Sections 3-6 report our empirical results. Section 7 reports robustness tests and discusses limitations of 
our methodology. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Data and methodology 
We obtain our initial sample from official documents that report corruption cases detected during 
1975-2015, such as Transparency International’s OECD Anti-Corruption Convention Progress Reports, 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission litigation, enforcement, and complaints releases, U.S. 
Department of Justice documents pertaining to violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 
and the UK’s Serious Fraud Office website. We also conduct a newspaper search, which allows us to 
identify earlier cases. Our initial sample consists of 737 corruption cases, for which we can identify the 
specific timing of the bribery in 433 cases.  
For inclusion in our final sample, we must be able to trace the public announcement of the award 
of the contract for which the bribe was paid, and the exact amount of the bribe corresponding to this 
contract. The date of the initial contract (not the date that the bribe was paid or that the bribery was 
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revealed) is the event date in our study. In many cases, firms bribe officials to reduce their tax or customs 
liability, to obtain permits or smaller contracts, and these events are not subject to public announcements. 
This step reduces our sample to 291 cases. Firms must have stock and financial statement information 
in Datastream, and there should be no other confounding news concurrent with the contract 
announcement, further reducing our sample. Our observations are at the contract level. Our final sample 
consists of 195 observations, involving 131 publicly listed firms from 24 stock markets that have been 
reported to have bribed government officials in 60 countries worldwide, and detected during 1975-2015 
(for bribes paid during 1971-2010). A break-down of the observations included in the sample by year is 
reported in Table A1 in the Appendix,. We observe more cases in the early 1990s and during the 1998-
2006 period.10  
Our selection process, which is driven by an international news search, allows us to have a 
significantly larger sample (and likely representing many more bribe-paying and bribe-taking countries) 
than Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2017). In addition, since we do not rely exclusively on FCPA prosecutions, 
20% of our sample consists of domestic bribery cases (where companies bribe government officials in 
their own countries, for example, in Japan, South Korea, and some European countries), which are not 
subject to FCPA jurisdiction. Therefore, our sample gives us a more representative cross-section of 
bribery cases. 
Our sample includes bribery cases that have been investigated by authorities. We do not require 
convictions for bribery for three reasons. First, the zeal with which national authorities prosecute high 
ranking government officials varies from country to country. As stated in the 2007 Annual Report of the 
 
10 If the firm secured more than one contract more than three years apart with the same bribe, we treat them as separate bribing 
incidents, and prorate the amount of the bribe. If the bribe was paid by a consortium, we include each firm as a separate 
observation. For the consortium, if the exact amount each of the firms paid is not provided but there is a detailed breakdown 
of the contract size by firm, we use the contribution of each firm to the contract in order to prorate the bribe; otherwise, we 
divide the amounts equally between the firms participating in the consortium. We include consortia fixed effects in the 
empirical analysis.  
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OECD Working Group on Bribery, “investigations of the foreign bribery offence … are steadily 
increasing; however, the number of convictions remains low. Many cases have not proceeded beyond 
the investigation stage. The Working Group would like to see more cases taken forward for prosecution” 
[p. 8]. Second, some bribes were paid at a time that it was not illegal in the firm’s country of origin to 
bribe foreign government officials (in many European countries, bribery abroad was made illegal only 
within the last couple of decades). Finally, investigations often lead to charges not for the bribery itself, 
but for crimes that are easier to prosecute, such as accounting fraud and money laundering. The Al 
Yamanah contracts of BAE in the UK11 and the case of Siemens in Greece12 are examples of such cases. 
We include them in our sample, because they give us a wider coverage of firms. However, they are not 
significantly different from the remaining cases, and excluding them does not affect our results. 
Information about the firms, countries, industries, and ranks of government officials involved is 
reported in Table 2. Bribe-paying firms in our sample mostly come from developed markets. The U.S., 
Japan, France, Germany, and the U.K. are the most prominent examples. They bribe government officials 
both in developed markets (Japan, South Korea, Singapore, U.S., among others) and in emerging markets 
(for example, in Nigeria, Philippines, Indonesia, India, Iraq, Lesotho, China, and South Africa, among 
others). Foreign bribes represent 80% of our sample. Most firms operate in the construction, electric, 
 
11 In May 2004, the Guardian newspaper alleged that BAE Systems won the 1985-1988 $86 billion “Al Yamanah” contracts 
supplying jets to Saudi Arabia by paying bribes to Saudi officials. UK’s Serious Fraud Office launched an investigation which 
was later dropped. As Prime Minister Tony Blair said, “our relationship with Saudi Arabia is vitally important for our 
country … that strategic interest comes first.” In June 2007, the U.S. Department of Justice investigated BAE, and forced a 
$400 million settlement on charges of false accounting (Timeline: BAE corruption probe, 26/06/2007; Blair defends Saudi 
probe ruling, 15/12/2006, BBC News, www.news.bbc.co.uk; U.S. launches corruption probe into Britain’s BAE, 26/06/2007, 
Reuters, www.reuters.com; BAE pays fines of £285m over arms deal corruption claims, 05/02/2010, The Guardian, 
www.guardian.co.uk) 
12 Investigations in Greece and Germany uncovered that Siemens paid tens of millions of Euros to Greek government officials 
over 17 years to secure contracts. During 2008-2010, following expiry of the prosecution period under the statute of 
limitations, a high-ranking official of the ruling PASOK party, and the former Telecommunications Minister, publicly 
admitted to have received payments. Siemens was never prosecuted. In March 2012, the Greek government came to a 
negotiated settlement with the company, which involved the payment of damages by the firm (“Siemens probe widens”, 
28/01/2008; “Siemens cash traced”, 03/05/2008; “First Siemens charges filed”, 02/07/2008; “Mantelis faces criminal 
charges”, 28/05/2010, Kathimerini, www.ekathimerini.com). 
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and electronic equipment (mostly defense related), aircraft (mostly defense related), and oil and gas 
industries. The government officials bribed are heads of state (presidents or prime ministers), ministers, 
members of parliament or political parties, local government governors or mayors, military officers, 
judges, heads of state-owned agencies, and others such as civil servants or members of procurement 
committees. Some firms bribe more than one official for the same contract.  
Table 3 reports how the bribery was detected by authorities. In over half the cases, the detection 
appears unrelated to the characteristics of the firms in our sample. In most cases, the revelation arose 
from investigation of the government official involved (rather than the firm), following a government or 
regime change in the bribe-taking country, and started in a foreign country different from the firm’s 
country of origin (32% of the cases in our sample). In the second most common form of detection, the 
detection for the bribery was a spin-off from an unrelated investigation (19%). On a few occasions, the 
detection followed voluntary disclosures by the firm (14%), actions by whistleblowers (7%), 
investigations by the press (7%), exogenous changes in enforcement (6%), and actions by competitors 
or other interested parties (5%).  
2.1 An empirical framework of the benefits that firms receive by paying bribes. 
To estimate the benefits that shareholders receive, we compute the cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) over days [-1,+1] relative to the initial contract event day (day 0) using event study methodology. 
CARs are estimated as the difference between daily raw returns (with dividends re-invested) and the 
return of the stock market index of the country where the firm is listed.13 We compute the gross benefits 
that firms receive as the cumulative change in firm market capitalization (CAR × firm market 
capitalization), summed over all relevant announcements pertaining to the same contract. These 
 
13 We obtain qualitatively similar results using market model residuals CARs. We focus on market-adjusted returns because 
the approach allows us a larger sample size (we do not need data during the estimation period), and because we prefer to use 
a consistent methodology across all markets that avoids the problems of thin trading arising from the widespread incidence 
of days with zero returns in some markets but not in others (Corrado and Truong, 2008).  
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announcement days include rumor announcements specifically mentioning that the firm in question has 
won the contract, as it is likely that part of the increase in market value of the firm is also driven by 
information leakage in the form of rumors. For robustness, we also examine the CARs only on the actual 
official award announcement date [-1,+1], as well as day 0, and our results are qualitatively similar. Our 
major dependent variable is the bribe NPV (estimated as the gross benefit minus the amount of the bribe). 
Our use of the CAR to quantify the benefits of bribery assumes that the market reaction to the 
announcement of the contract is efficient. Even if the market reaction is inefficient, managerial 
performance and turnover are, to a large extent, evaluated using the evolution of stock prices over the 
manager’s tenure, so it is reasonable to assume that firms will use the likely market reaction as a criterion 
when deciding whether to pay a bribe or not. 
Our benchmark for assessing abnormal stock performance is a general market benchmark. It 
might be argued that a better comparison might be between bribing firms and the remaining bidders who 
bid for the same contract but did not win. There are three potential problems with this approach. Not all 
bribes in our sample were the result of competitive bidding. There is no disclosed data on the firms that 
bid but lost the contract in the reports that we use to compile our sample of bribing firms. Finally, the 
dynamics of the bidding process are unknown. In the presence of a winner’s curse or if some bidders are 
subject to agency costs of managerial discretion, companies may over-bid. In such a case, losing the 
contract may be good news for these firms, making it difficult for us to evaluate the market reaction for 
failed bidders. Our approach is similar to the assessment of the market reaction to merger announcements, 
which uses general market indices as benchmarks rather than the performance of the remaining bidders 
for the same target who did not complete the deal.  
The source of rents that firms receive by paying bribes is usually some form of monopoly power 
arising from the award of an exclusive contract. Our measure of the benefits is based on the change in 
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the bribing firm’s market value from the market reaction at the announcement of the contract award and 
on the bribe that was paid in order to secure the contract. To illustrate the assumptions behind this 
measure, we use the following simple framework. Consider a firm that operates over two dates. At date 
0, investors know with probability p that the firm will announce winning a contract worth gross value X. 
(X is the net present value of the project before we consider the bribe payment.) Investors also know that, 
if the contract is won, there is a probability b that the firm paid a bribe B. Conditional on having paid a 
bribe, there is also a probability c that the bribery will be revealed and that the firm will be liable for 
costs and penalties C. The firm has no other assets than this one project, so its value at date 0 is: 
V0 = p(X – bB – bcC)         
At date 1, the firm announces the award of the contract but investors do not know with certainty 
whether it paid a bribe for it. The date 1 value of the firm is therefore 
V1 = X – bB – bcC         
and the change in firm value (which is what we compute empirically) is  
ΔV1 = V1 - V0 = (1 – p)(X – bB – bcC)      
Given that a bribe has been paid, we assume that the firm receives the contract with certainty.14 The true 
NPV of the project after the bribery (which is what the firm bases its decision to bribe on) is X – B – cC 
and the difference between our empirical measure of the ex ante benefits ΔV1 – B and the true NPV is  
 (ΔV1 – B) – (X – B – cC) = (1 – p)(X – bB - bcC) – X + cC   (1) 
In practice, the probabilities p, b, and c are not observable. While we do not try to estimate them directly, 
we do control for factors that may affect them. Specifically, we distinguish the following cases: 
 
14 There are a handful of documented cases when firms paid bribes but did not get contracts (for example, in 2002, Monsanto 
paid $50,000 to an Indonesian official in a failed bid to repeal unfavorable regulation) but these are extremely rare exceptions. 
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 If p = b = 0, that is if the award of the contract and the bribe payment are not anticipated, then 
the difference in (1) above equals cC. Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2017) estimate this figure to be 
very low (see below). In our analysis, we include controls that are correlated with cC.  
 For any given 3-day event window, p is likely to be close to zero, unless the exact day of the 
announcement of the contract award is known with certainty in advance, which is unlikely. In 
addition, many contracts in our sample do not result from competitive bidding (regulatory favors, 
licenses etc.). In these cases as well, p may be close to zero, since the dates or whether any such 
favors will be announced are highly uncertain. If the award of the contract is partially anticipated, 
in which case p is positive, our measure under-estimates the true benefits from the bribe. In our 
analysis, we, therefore, include control variables that are correlated with p.  
 Finally, investors may assign a positive probability b to the likelihood that a bribe was paid 
following the announcement of the contract award. Since the difference in (1) is decreasing in b, 
our empirical measure may under-estimate the benefits that firms receive by paying bribes. In 
our specifications, we, therefore, also include numerous control variables that are correlated with 
b. 
Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2017) conduct an exhaustive analysis of point estimates for the ex ante 
bribe NPV incorporating estimates of the unobservable probabilities and the costs of penalties. It is useful 
to calibrate our intuitive ex ante bribe NPV to their measure. Using data from Table 6, Panel B, in their 
paper, the average intuitive bribe NPV (estimated as in our paper as ΔV1 – B) equals 2.83% of bribing 
firm market capitalization. Using their parameter values, the NPV (estimated as X – B – cC) is 2.61%. 
Our intuitive approach, therefore, overestimates their measure by only 0.22 percentage points (or 8%). 
Part of this difference is due to the exclusion of cC from our measure (which they estimate as equal to 
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6.38% × 6.81% = 0.43%).15 The remaining difference is a reflection of how good an estimate ΔV1 is for 
the project’s gross value X (whether the contract award is partially anticipated), and whether the 
probability of a bribe payment has already been factored in the market reaction to the contract 
announcement. Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2017) discuss how their estimates of b and c are very sensitive 
to alternative assumptions. However, inferences regarding bribe NPV are robust to even very large 
variation in b and c.  
Given the very small difference between our measure and the approach used by Karpoff, Lee, 
and Martin (2017), and given that estimates of the latter require numerous assumptions, in the remainder 
of this paper, we estimate bribe NPV simply as the difference between the change in market 
capitalization at the contract award announcement minus the bribe payment (ΔV1 – B). As illustrated in 
Figure 1, our main specifications are based on cumulative CARs that aggregate all news events 
associated with a specific contract, from the very first rumor that a contract award to the firm is expected 
to the end of the awarding process and the signing of the contract agreement. This approach is likely to 
control for the unobservable likelihood that the contract award is partially anticipated by the market (p). 
Our results are qualitatively similar if we use only the formal contract announcement date to measure 
CARs, and we report both approaches for robustness. 
In order to correct for any residual error, we also explicitly include controls that are correlated 
with the unobservable probabilities p, b, c, and the bribing costs C. For example, we use an indicator 
variable for whether the contract award was the result of a competitive tender. This has the potential to 
affect p because, in contracts awarded through competitive tenders, though the market may partially 
anticipate the outcome, a high degree of competition from other competitors submitting tenders implies 
 
15 In many cases the reduction in value that firms experienced following the detection and the fines that they received pertain 
to multiple contracts. Since our sample may include only some of these contracts, the expected reduction in firm value per 
contract should be even smaller. 
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a low ex ante probability for any individual firm winning the contract. In addition, the dates that contracts 
not subject to tenders are conferred, are highly uncertain. Similarly, we control for Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index in the bribe-taking country. This is likely to be correlated 
with the likelihood that the bribe payment has been anticipated. We control for whether the firm has 
been publicly detected paying bribes before, whether the firm has paid bribes in the same country before 
even if this was not public knowledge at the time it won the contract, add dummy variables for the 
payment of domestic bribes (where detection might be easier), and use indicator variables for whether 
the firm is subject to the provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in the U.S. (covering 
both U.S. firms and firms listed in the U.S. that have paid bribes in foreign countries while the FCPA 
has been in force); and whether the firm is subject to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (OECD 
member firms which have paid bribes in foreign countries while the Convention has been in force in 
their respective home countries). It is plausible that being under the scrutiny of the FCPA or the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention increases both the likelihood of detection and any subsequent penalties the 
firm may face. Finally, we estimate industry- and country-fixed effects as additional controls for the 
likelihood that the bribe payment was anticipated, since some industries and countries may be considered 
to be more corrupt than others. We also include consortia fixed effects (if applicable) and a time trend, 
since anti-corruption enforcement has improved over time. 
We also perform a series of related robustness tests. We estimate the market-adjusted change in 
market value on the date the bribery was first revealed to the market. According to Karpoff, Lee, and 
Martin (2017), the estimated ex ante probability of detection for bribery is 6.38%. Using this probability 
and our measure of costs, the ex ante expected value of detection and punishment that our methodology 
ignores (cC) is only 0.1% of firm market value. The correlation between our bribe NPV and an NPV 
adjusted for the costs of detection is 0.996. All our results are unchanged if we use the adjusted measure 
- 19 - 
 
in our regressions. Finally, in analysis that we do not report in the tables for brevity, we also analyze 
aggregate measures of benefits (the sum of all CARs pertaining to the contract and the gross benefits as 
a proportion of the size of the project), without subtracting the bribe payment (effectively assuming that 
b=1), and obtain qualitatively similar results. 
Finally, we note that our analysis does not attempt to derive point estimates for the absolute 
benefits of bribery per se but to examine how these benefits vary cross-sectionally and to compare the 
benefits across sub-samples. If any residual error in our estimates affects all sample observations in a 
similar fashion, then our results on explaining the cross-sectional variation in the benefits and our 
comparisons across sub-samples should not be biased.  
2.2. Other variables 
Financial statement data, stock returns, exchange rates, and GDP deflators are obtained from 
CRSP, Compustat, Datastream, the PACAP database, Factset, and International Financial Statistics 
(IFS). Country-level data are obtained from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (2010), 
Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org), the Polity IV project (www.systemicpeace.org), the World 
Bank (data.worldbank.org), Transparency International (www.transparency.org), issues of the Doing 
Business Report (published by the World Bank), and the Global Competitiveness Report (published by 
the World Economic Forum). The list, definition, and sources of data for our measures of the size of 
bribes, the benefits that firms receive, firm and contract characteristics, and measures of country-level 
variables appears in the Appendix Table A.2. 
2.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics on the bribes and the benefits that firms receive. All figures 
are converted to constant 2005 U.S. dollars using exchange rates at the announcement of the contract 
and the U.S. GDP deflator. The skewness in the distribution of benefits is striking. Therefore, we report 
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the mean, median, and the first and third quartile values. Throughout the paper, descriptive statistics and 
univariate test figures are based on raw data. All regressions are, however, estimated on data winsorized 
at the top/bottom 1%. 
The mean (median) bribe in our sample is almost $21 million ($4 million), representing, on 
average, $0.95 per share or 4.6% (2.6%) of the size of the contract, with a mean contract size of almost 
$2.3 billion ($200 million). We are able to identify the contract size for only 40% of the observations in 
our sample. This is because some projects do not have a fixed size (for example, when a company obtains 
a license that allows it access to a certain market or exemption from regulations or tax or judicial favors) 
or due to lack of data.  
On average, the bribes in our sample represent 6.1% of the bribing firm’s book value of equity, 
1.1% of total assets, and 26.2% of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). They also represent very 
significant amounts for the government officials who receive them, since the average bribe is more than 
23,000 times larger than the government official’s country GDP per capita. These bribes allow firms to 
receive, on average, 44.6% of the rents from the contract. In untabulated analysis, we identify 83 cases 
where we obtain the dates of the bribe payment relative to the contract award. In 47 of these cases (57% 
of the sample), the bribe was paid to the government official after the contract was awarded to the firm. 
In 30 cases (36% of the sample), there were payments both before and after the contract award. In only 
6 cases (7%), were there payments made only before the contract was awarded. Therefore, these bribes 
appear to be paid to obtain specific benefits. They are not paid in order to build long-term political 
connections (although in a few cases, companies obtain a series of successive contracts that follow the 
same pattern). In addition, the bribes in our sample do not conform to a “pay to play” scenario, whereby 
firms pay bribes in order to enter the bidding process, and subsequently contracts are awarded to the best 
bidder. We also find that all foreign bribery cases where we can identify how the bribe payment was 
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made, channeled the payments through a local intermediary, and the payments were recorded as 
consulting “fees” and “commissions.” 
The mean bribe NPV is $122 million, representing $3,408 of benefit per dollar of bribe. While 
this sounds large, we note that there is a large variation in the benefits that firms receive in our sample. 
Our results suggest that these benefits are not large for all companies. The median firm receives a 
negative NPV of -$4 million, representing a return of $0.12 per dollar of bribe. This result suggests that 
paying bribes may be a manifestation of agency costs of managerial discretion. Ultimately, it is 
individuals who make the decision to pay bribes. The return to those individuals (for example, in the 
form of managing a larger company and empire building) may be greater than the gains for the firms.  
The median contract announcement CARs that we document are much smaller than the median 
one-day CARs of 2.23% for the 62 (likely U.S.) firms that have won contracts overseas and have been 
subject to FCPA prosecution in the sample analyzed by Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2017). We note, 
however, that the composition of our sample is very different from theirs. Roughly one third of the cases 
in our sample involve domestic bribery, so are likely to involve smaller contracts. The earliest case in 
our sample is from 1971, and the median contract was awarded in 1998, a period not heavily represented 
in Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2017)’s sample. When we examine separately the 57 U.S. firms in our 
sample that have bribed overseas (not reported in the table), the median one-day (three-day) contract 
announcement CAR is 1.6% (1.7%). These figures are similar to those reported by Karpoff, Lee, and 
Martin (2017). 
The earliest public announcement date on the detection of the bribe in our sample in Table 4 is 
associated with mean (median) 3-day abnormal returns of –1.9% (–1.3%) with both p-values equal to 
0.000. For U.S. bribing firms, the effect (not reported in the table) is –1.8% (–0.7%). This estimate is 
similar to the estimates made by Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2017) Table 2, Panel B, who report roughly 
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similar figures of –3.07% (–0.53%), and Sampath, Gardberg, and Rahman (2018) who report an estimate 
of –1.85%. The UK firms in our sample earned mean (median) CARs of –1.8% (–1.4%) when their 
bribery was revealed, which is much larger than the –0.73% average reduction in firm value estimated 
by Zeume (2017) following the passage of the UK Bribery Act 2010. The difference likely arises because 
Zeume (2017)’s estimate is effectively an expected value of the impact of the revelation of bribery, and 
the market may be assigning a relatively low ex ante probability that firms that have actually bribed will 
be eventually prosecuted, even after the passage of the Act.  
Finally, when we examine the net CARs (contract award CARs minus the detection CARs), we 
find that firms earn average net ex post CARs of –1.0% (p-value 0.190) and median CARs of –1.1% (p-
value 0.024). Therefore, ex post, bribery does not appear good value for the firms that do get caught.16 
2.4. Performance characteristics of bribing firms 
Table 5 investigates the performance characteristics of the firms in our sample. We conduct two 
types of comparisons. First, we compare the performance characteristics of the firms that enter our final 
sample with a subset of the original sample of 737 firms. The comparison subset consists of firms that 
have been reported bribing but we were unable to obtain detailed contract data for inclusion in our final 
sample (Column 1-2). Second, we compare bribing firms in our sample with a matched control group of 
firms without reported bribery incidents (Column 3). The explanatory firm performance variables are 
return on equity (ROE), operating profit margin, asset turnover, debt-equity ratio, market-to-book ratio, 
sales growth for the past two years before the contract award, and firm size. We include country, industry, 
 
16 The names of companies that participated in tenders but lost the contract are generally not reported in the sources that focus 
on the corrupt company. Furthermore, many of the cases in our sample do not involve competition for the same contract or 
license. We are able to identify 22 firms that had made the final shortlist but lost the bid to firms in our sample that paid 
bribes. Among the 8 firms with available stock returns data the median CAR at the announcement of the contract loss is -0.24% 
(not statistically significant). 
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and year fixed effects. Overall, we cannot conclude that the firms in our sample exhibit different 
performance characteristics than their peers. 
 The logit specification in Column 1 is estimated using the sample of bribing firms that enter the 
final sample and bribing firms that were in the original sample but had no available data on contract 
dates or bribe amounts. Sales growth is the only coefficient that is statistically significant, suggesting 
that firms which made it into the final sample were growing more slowly. In Column 2, we include 
observations for firms that did not enter the final sample but for which bribe amounts were reported. Not 
surprisingly, the firms that made it into the final sample due to data availability, are those that paid larger 
bribes.  Finally, in Column 3, we compare our bribing firms with a matched control group of firms 
without reported bribery incidents. In untabulated results, we find that our sample firms are significantly 
larger than the average/median firms in their country and industry in terms of sales, assets, and market 
capitalization. Therefore, we select a control sample of firms that have not been reported to have paid 
bribes and are matched to our bribing firms by country, industry, size, and market-to-book ratio three 
years before payment of the bribe. Although some of the competitors of the bribing firms may be 
international, we match by country of the bribe-paying company, in order to control for different 
accounting standards across countries. In addition, managerial decisions on the value of paying a bribe, 
and the evaluation of managerial performance, are likely based on comparisons relative to firm 
benchmarks in the same country and industry. Furthermore, for a large proportion of our sample, there 
are no direct competitors bidding for the same contract or license.  
 The results indicate that there are few performance differences between our bribing and matched 
control sample firms, with the exception of asset turnover, which is lower, and sales, which is higher for 
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our bribing firm sample. This suggests that bribing firms are not more efficient than non-bribing firms, 
as the “greasing the wheels of bureaucracy” hypothesis suggests.17  
 In subsequent analysis, we include the same operating performance measures for the bribing 
firms as explanatory variables, after expressing them in terms of abnormal performance (defined as the 
difference between the performance measure for the bribing firm less that for its matched control sample 
firm). The exact definitions appear Table A.2 in the Appendix. 
3. Baseline specification of the relationship between bribe payments and benefits  
We first report our baseline measure of the relationship between the bribe payments that firms 
make and the benefits that they receive. Results from simulations reported by Barth and Kallapur (1996) 
indicate that, in cross-sectional regressions of levels-based accounting and market value variables, 
regressing unscaled variables, including a scale factor (such as sales), and reporting White (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-consistent p-values, mitigates coefficient bias and heteroskedasticity better than 
scaling the variables. Nevertheless, we also report the same regressions after scaling the gross benefit 
and the bribe payment by scaling factors commonly used in accounting research, such as total assets, 
book value of equity, EBIT, and the number of outstanding shares. We include sales as a scale proxy in 
all specifications. We winsorize continuous variables at the top/bottom 1%, in all regressions in the 
remainder of the paper. We report p-values based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity that 
cluster at the country level. 
 
17 Siegel and Jeong (2018) analyze Korean data and find that high-status firms which have experienced financial difficulties 
are more likely to bribe in order to gain a competitive advantage. In untabulated analysis we compare the 5 Korean firms in 
our bribing sample with their 5 matched control counterparts. In the 2-year period prior to paying the bribe, the Korean 
bribing firms experienced sales growth of 3.8%, which is significantly lower compared to their counterparts who didn’t pay 
bribes which experienced 29.2% (p-value for difference in medians 0.06). The bribing firms also had lower asset turnover 
and higher leverage (both medians marginally not statistically significant, with p-values 0.144) but did not differ in other 
performance characteristics.  
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Jeong and Weiner (2011) suggest a correlation between the magnitude of the benefits and the 
size of bribe payments. In Table 6, we estimate the benefit that firms receive per dollar of bribe as the 
coefficient from a regression of the gross benefit (change in market capitalization) on the bribe payment. 
In Panel A, we report specifications using unscaled variables with and without country fixed effects.  
The correlation between bribe payments and the gross bribe benefit is highly statistically 
significant, with all p-values less than 0.02. The results in Columns 1-3 show that firms receive between 
$6-9 of benefits for every dollar of bribe they pay (these estimates represent a marginal effect, and not 
an average ratio). These estimates are close to estimates made by the U.S Department of Justice and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, based on cases that they have prosecuted, which arrived at a 
similar average of $10.93 of benefit per dollar of bribe using different methodologies (Karpoff, Lee, and 
Martin, 2010). Column 4 reports specifications based on CARs computed using the contract award 
announcement only (excluding rumors and other related announcements, such as agreement ratifications 
etc.). 18  Column 5 reports specifications based on contract award announcement day=0 (one-day) 
announcement CARs. The magnitude of the coefficients of bribe payments is halved in these 
specifications but their statistical significance is not affected. 
Panel B reports the same regressions after including a large number of additional control 
variables, and fixed effects. These control variables are included in order to control for the unobservable 
probabilities that the contract, the bribe payment, and the detection and punishment may have been 
partially anticipated by the market during the contract award announcement (discussed in Section 2). 
Anticipation controls are variables correlated with the probability that the contract award and/or the bribe 
payment has been anticipated by the market (whether the contract resulted from a competitive tender, 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index in the bribe-taking country, whether the firm 
 
18 In our baseline specifications we include “rumors” announcements only if the rumors clearly identify the firm’s name. 
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has been publicly detected paying bribes before, whether the firm is known to have won contracts by 
paying bribes in the same country before even if this was not public knowledge at the time). Performance 
controls are abnormal (relative to the control sample) bribing firm ROE, operating profit margin, asset 
turnover, market-to-book ratio, and debt-equity ratio at the last fiscal year before the contract award. We 
include performance controls because it is plausible that anti-bribery enforcing authorities may pursue 
firms with specific performance characteristics, e.g. the most profitable firms that have greater ability to 
pay fines. Additional controls in some specifications include dummy variables for the payment of 
domestic bribes, whether the firm is subject to the provisions of the FCPA in the U.S., and whether the 
firm is subject to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Consortia fixed effects are for companies that 
bribe as part of a consortium. A time trend is included to control for changes in enforcement (which has 
become more stringent) over time. Industry- and country-fixed effects control for the likelihood that the 
bribe payment was anticipated, since some industries and countries are likely to be perceived as more 
corrupt than others. In columns 1-2, we find that including these controls does not affect the magnitude 
or the statistical significance of the bribe payment coefficients, which remain in the $5-9 range. 
The benefit that firms receive from paying bribes in absolute terms should be proportional to the 
project size. Larger contracts may reward firms with larger benefits in absolute terms compared to 
smaller contracts. Unfortunately, we can obtain contract value for only 40% of the observations in our 
sample (see Table 4), both because of missing values and because some of the projects in our sample do 
not have fixed project sizes (for example, when a firm obtains a license to sell a certain drug in the 
future). In Columns 3-4, we replicate the specifications after including project size as an explanatory 
variable. These specifications are estimated on 71 observations with available data. Given the small 
number of observations we include only contract size, firm size, anticipation controls and controls for 
domestic, FCPA, OECD Anti-bribery convention jurisdiction, industry fixed effects, consortium fixed 
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effects, and a time trend, since these control variables are more likely to control for the unobservable 
probabilities of the firm getting detected and paying penalties. Depending on the explanatory variables 
included, the coefficients associated with the magnitude of the bribe range between 4.93 and 6.28 (p-
values between 0.044-0.095). These results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Columns 1-2. 
Overall, the magnitude of these coefficients is similar to those estimated by De Figueiredo and 
Silverman (2006), who find that for universities represented by House Appropriations Committee or 
Senate Appropriations Committee members when lobbying for earmarks, the marginal return 
attributable to one dollar of lobbying is between $4.52 and $5.24. 
Finally, Panel C reports similar regressions, including the full set of control variables, where the 
gross benefits and the bribe payments are both scaled by total assets, book value of equity, EBIT, and 
number of outstanding shares. While the magnitude of the coefficients when scaling by number of 
outstanding shares in Column 4 is of the same order of magnitude as before, those scaled by total assets, 
book value of equity and EBIT in Columns 1-3 are substantially smaller. Nevertheless, the statistical 
significance of the coefficients is not affected. All specifications show a strong correlation between bribe 
payments and the benefits that firms receive.19 
4. Additional factors that drive the magnitude of benefits that firms receive by paying bribes  
We next examine additional factors that drive the magnitude of the benefits received by the firms. 
In Table 7, we report coefficients for two measures of benefits: the net benefits or bribe NPV (gross 
 
19 In untabulated results, we perform the same analysis separately within each of the main Fama-French industries, based on 
their 12-industry classification. The coefficients of the bribe variable for the main industries (consumer durables, 
manufacturing, energy, wholesale and retail, and defense) are positive and statistically significant, and indicate that the 
benefits that firms receive increase by between $8-55 for each dollar of bribe they pay. Two industries (business equipment 
and telecommunications) show positive coefficients that are not significant at conventional levels. Three industries (chemicals, 
utilities, and finance) also show positive coefficients but there are not enough observations to estimate meaningful p-values. 
Finally, there are three industries representing a small number of observations (construction, building materials and real estate, 
consumer non-durables, and health) where the coefficients of the bribe variable are negative but insignificant. Overall, our 
results appear robust within the industries with the most observations in the sample. 
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benefit minus the bribe payment in Panel A), and the marginal benefit per dollar of bribe (following the 
specifications of the previous section in Panel B). We include proxies for the remaining 10 hypotheses 
listed in Table 1. For robustness, the last two columns in each panel report results where the benefits are 
estimated based on contract announcement award date CARs only (excluding rumors etc.) and based on 
one-day CARs. In order to economize on space, we report one specification where the benefits are 
unscaled (Column 1) and other specifications where the benefits are scaled by total assets (all remaining 
columns). We also estimate the same specifications with other alternative scaling factors, obtaining 
qualitatively similar results overall. We estimate specifications with alternative proxies for many of these 
hypotheses with qualitatively similar results. 
Some of the explanatory variables are at the micro (firm, project, contract, or bribe) level, while 
others are at the macro (country) level. Country-level variables include the measure of public disclosure 
of politicians’ sources of income constructed by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (2010) 
in the bribe-taking country, a democracy score from the Polity IV project (www.systemicpeace.org) that 
takes values from +10 (full democracy) to −10 (full autocracy), proxies for legal efficiency and customs 
burdens from the Global Competitiveness Report by the World Economic Forum (we express the raw 
scores from the report as deciles across all countries with scores in the report, with decile 1 representing 
highest standards and decile 10 representing lowest standards),20  and Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for the bribe-taking country. Since the original scores for the CPI 
range from 0-10 with higher values corresponding to less corruption, to make the interpretation of the 
coefficients more intuitive, we express the score as 10 minus the country’s raw score. Therefore, in our 
specifications, 0 represents no corruption and 10 the highest level of corruption.   
 
20 We use the scores for customs burden in preference to statutory rates, because Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton 
(1998) show that statutory rates may not be good proxies for the actual burden that firms face. Other proxies for regulation 
were not significant. 
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In Panel A, the first hypothesis that we examine is whether the information disclosure regime in 
the country of the government official receiving the bribe affects the benefits that firms receive. Given 
that the most common way that the bribery is detected in our sample was as a result of an investigation 
of the government official who received it (see Table 3), we focus on information disclosure in the 
recipient’s country of origin. We find that the measure of public disclosure of politicians’ sources of 
income constructed by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (2010) in the bribe-taking 
country is negative and statistically significant in 3 out of the 4 specifications estimated. This result 
suggests that better information disclosure in the bribe-taking country is associated with smaller benefits 
for bribing firms. We also estimate (untabulated) specifications after adding newspaper circulation in 
the bribe-taking country as an additional proxy for information disclosure. Overall, we obtain 
qualitatively similar but less significant results. This may be because newspaper circulation figures are 
available for only a subset of the countries in our sample and the specifications are estimated using a 
reduced sample size. Our results are in line with previous studies on the importance of information, or 
the ease of detection of the bribery in limiting corruption (Rasmusen and Ramseyer, 1994). Our evidence 
suggests that publicity may reduce the size of the benefits that firms receive from bribes as well.  
The remaining explanatory variables in panel A are mostly not statistically significant, with two 
exceptions. First, higher democracy score is associated with larger benefits in 1 out of the 4 specifications 
(column 3), with the coefficient being marginally statistically significant at the 10% level (in line with 
Rasmusen and Ramseyer, 1994; Bombardini and Trebbi, 2011; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Second, the 
award of non-competitive contracts (whether the contract pertained to licenses or other favors that are 
not granted through a competitive tender), is negatively related to the benefits in also in one specification 
(in line with Svensson, 2005; D’Souza and Kaufmann, 2013). It may not be surprising that the benefits 
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to these bribes may be smaller compared to the benefits from mega-projects that companies may be 
awarded in competitive tenders.  
Finally, we find no support for the remaining hypotheses, namely that firms bribing politicians 
with greater hold-up power (heads of state – presidents, prime-ministers – government ministers, 
members of parliament, governing political parties) receive smaller benefits (McMillan and Zoido, 2004; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Ades and Di Tella, 1999; D’Souza and Kaufmann, 2013), that the firm’s 
ability to pay (profitability) is inversely related to the benefits that firms receive (Svensson, 2003), that 
government officials capture a larger share of the rents from complex defense, construction or 
engineering infrastructure projects (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993), that long-term relationships with 
politicians matter (Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; Jayachandran, 2006; De Figueiredo and Tiller, 2001; De 
Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006; Bertrand, Bombardini and Trebbi, 2014; Bombardini and Trebbi, 2012; 
2011) or for any of the remaining control variables. More specifically, the ex ante perception that bribes 
might have been paid for winning the contract (both at the contract and at the country level) does not 
appear significant in explaining the benefits that firms receive. 
In Table 7 Panel B, we estimate an alternative specification, where our variable of interest is the 
marginal benefit per dollar of bribe that firms pay. These specifications use the baseline specification of 
Table 6, Panel C, Column 1 with the full set of control variables (see previous section) and add 
interaction terms between the magnitude of the bribe payment with the explanatory variable of interest 
(public disclosure of politicians’ sources of income, (lack of) legal efficiency, democracy score, customs 
burden (all pertaining to the bribe-taking country), the rank of the politician bribed and firm profitability). 
To economize on space, we report only the coefficients of the interaction terms, measuring the marginal 
effect of the explanatory variable of interest. 
- 31 - 
 
Lack of legal efficiency is positively related to the marginal benefits that firms receive (in 2 out 
of the 3 specifications), while the customs burdens is negatively related to bribe benefits across all 3 
specifications. Compared to the previous specifications in Panel A, the rank of the politician bribed is 
now positively related to the marginal benefit per dollar of bribe that firms receive in 2 out of the 3 
specifications. This result is the opposite of what would be expected, according to the hypothesis that 
politicians with larger hold-up power earn larger benefits for themselves at the expense of the bribing 
firm. It is more in line with the conjecture that high-ranking officials may be able to deliver contracts to 
firms with a higher probability (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Finally, the public disclosure of the 
politician sources of income, the democracy score and firm profitability remain insignificant in 
explaining the benefits. We also estimate specifications including interactions with other performance 
measures but do not obtain consistent results. 
Overall, the results in this section indicate that among the factors that appear significant in 
explaining the size of the benefits are variables related to information disclosure, followed by the rank 
of the politician bribed, regulatory burdens, and legal efficiency.  
5. Does bribing in democratic and autocratic countries provide different levels of benefits?  
The literature on the economics of public choice discusses several reasons why bribes paid to 
politicians in democratic countries may be small relative to the benefits they bestow on the firm (Tullock, 
1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Rasmusen and Ramseyer, 1994; Bombardini and Trebbi, 2011). Our 
earlier results do not show any differences in the net-of-bribe benefits that firms receive in more 
democratic countries. However, some of the variables examined in the previous section may have 
differential impacts on corruption in democratic than in non-democratic countries. For example, the 
disclosure of politicians’ sources of income may be more important in democratic countries (where these 
politicians may lose office or get prosecuted for corruption) than in dictatorial regimes. Similarly, in 
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small dictatorial countries, it may be necessary to bribe the President in order to secure a weapons deal, 
whereas in a country like the U.S., one would likely have to bribe military officers rather than the 
President. Hence, in this section, we separately analyze bribes paid in democratic and non-democratic 
countries. We note that roughly two-thirds of our sample contains bribes paid in democratic bribe-taking 
countries. 
We report two types of analyses. Table 8 reports a univariate analysis of the size of bribes and 
the benefits that firms receive. Table 9 reports specifications of the determinants of magnitude of the 
benefits from the previous section separately for bribes paid in democratic and non-democratic bribe-
taking countries.  
In Table 8, we report three measures of the size of bribes (absolute size, relative to bribe-taking 
country GDP per capita, and relative to the size of the contract) and five measures of the benefits: the 
net benefit or bribe NPV (as estimated previously), the bribe profitability index (the ratio of the gross 
benefits divided by the bribe payment), the absolute size of the gross benefits, the ratio of the benefits 
received by the firm as a proportion of the total rents from the contract (where total rents are defined as 
the sum of the firm’s benefit and the bribe received by the government official), and finally the gross 
benefits as a proportion of the contract value.21  
In panel A, we separate the sample into democratic and non-democratic countries. The Polity IV 
democracy index takes values from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy), so we classify countries 
as democratic if the index value for the specific country is greater than 0 and as non-democratic if the 
value of the index is less than or equal to 0. We find mixed evidence on whether the size of bribes is 
smaller in democratic countries. In absolute terms, bribes paid in democratic countries appear smaller 
(median $2.2 million compared to $5.1 million). However, they are larger relative to the size of the 
 
21 To facilitate the interpretation of the results on the division of rents, we consider the firm’s share of the rents to be zero 
when its gross benefit is negative. Our results are qualitatively similar if we do not perform this adjustment. 
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contract (median 3% compared to 1%). The differences on the absolute size may be because smaller 
bribes for smaller contracts may get detected in democratic countries than in non-democratic countries. 
There are no statistically significant differences in the benefits that firms receive from these bribes. 
In Panel B, we compare democratic countries that have the highest democratic standards (those 
that receive scores 7, 8, 9, and 10 in the Polity IV index) with autocratic countries that have the lowest 
standards (scores -7, -8, -9, and -10). Again, we do not find consistent results when comparing the size 
of bribes. We find that firms pay smaller bribes as a share of bribe-taking country GDP per capita but 
larger bribes as a share of the contract value in democratic bribe-taking countries. As before, there are 
no significant differences in the benefits that firms receive. 
Finally, given that the original studies to derive hypotheses related to democratic regimes based 
their inferences on observations in highly developed countries, in Panel C, we compare bribes paid in 
the U.S. or in European Union (EU) countries with bribes paid in autocratic countries that have the 
lowest standards (scores -7, -8, -9, and -10 in the index). Again, we observe that firms pay smaller bribes 
as a share of bribe-taking country GDP per capita but larger bribes as a share of the contract value in the 
U.S./EU than in autocratic bribe-taking countries. There are no significant differences in the benefits 
that firms receive between the two sub-samples. In line with our findings in the previous section, we do 
not find evidence that firms in democratic countries pay small bribes relative to the benefits that they 
receive in our sample. 
In Table 9, we estimate the specifications of the determinants of the benefits separately in sub-
samples of democratic and non-democratic bribe-taking countries. To economize on space, we report 
only results where net benefit or bribe NPV (scaled by total assets) is the dependent variable. Although 
some of the main results from the previous section remain robust, we do observe some notable 
differences. Public disclosure of politicians’ sources of income is significantly negatively associated 
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with the benefits that firms receive only in democratic countries (Columns 1-2). In contrast, the 
determinants of the benefits for firms that bribe government officials in non-democratic countries in 
Columns 3-4 show no influence of disclosure variables. Not surprisingly, it appears that disclosure does 
not matter for governments who do not face elections and cannot be removed from power. Also, not 
surprisingly, the rank of the politician receiving the bribe is positively related to the benefits only in non-
democratic countries. Corruption perceptions are positively related to the benefits only in non-
democratic countries. So, firms appear to receive more benefits when they bribe politicians in highly 
corrupt autocratic countries. Finally, in autocratic countries firms receive lower benefits from complex 
engineering projects, which is in line with the Shleifer and Vishny (1993) conjecture that government 
officials are able to extract a larger share of the rents from such projects. 
Interestingly, firms that have been detected paying bribes before receive larger benefits in 
subsequent contracts awarded in non-democratic countries. This may be because these firms build long-
term political connections by paying bribes (Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; Jayachandran, 2006) rather 
than focus on the benefits from specific contracts.22 Perhaps bribery of autocratic politicians, who are 
expected to stay in power for long periods, allows firms to build long-term political connections with 
them and expropriate larger benefits over the long run. In contrast, bribing democratically elected 
politicians is technically illegal and not necessarily transferable when governments change frequently – 
therefore, bribes do not allow firms to build the same long-term connections in democratic countries. 
D’Souza and Kaufmann (2013) conjecture that bribery in high-income countries is likely to be 
fundamentally different from bribery in low-income countries. In analysis that we do not report in the 
 
22 A related stream of literature examines the returns to lobbying U.S. politicians (see for example, De Figueiredo and Tiller, 
2001; De Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006; Bertrand, Bombardini and Trebbi, 2014; Bombardini and Trebbi, 2012; 
Bombardini and Trebbi, 2011). Political connections have been associated with easier access to bank finance (Sapienza, 2004; 
Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Giannetti and Ongena, 2009; Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven, 2008), government sponsored bailouts 
(Faccio, Masulis and McConnell, 2006), and more government contracts (Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2013). 
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tables, we perform an alternative test, where we estimate the same specifications after dividing our 
sample between OECD and non-OECD member bribe-taking countries. Overall, however, we do not 
find any systematic differences between the two sub-samples. Therefore, our results suggest that it is the 
type of the political environment and institutions that is associated with different drivers behind the 
benefits to bribery rather than the bribe-taking country’s income level. 
6. Does anti‐bribery enforcement matter?  
We next examine whether direct anti-bribery enforcement in the bribe-paying country has an 
impact on the benefits that firms receive. D’Souza and Kaufmann (2013) hypothesize that strong anti-
corruption enforcement increases the cost of bribery to firms, and therefore reduces the benefits. U.S. 
bribe-paying firms (and firms cross-listed or with substantial operations in the U.S.) have been subject 
to strong enforcement under the U.S. FCPA, which is the earliest, most stringent, and widely enforced 
anti-bribery regulation worldwide, dating back to 1977. In addition, companies from OECD countries 
are now subject to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, which “establishes legally binding standards to 
criminalize bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions and provides for a 
host of related measures that make this effective.”23 This convention was signed in 1997 and entered into 
force in each signatory country over the decade 1999-2009.24  
In Table 10, Panel A, we report univariate analysis for medians for the bribe payments, benefits, 
CARs at the earliest date announcing disclosure of the bribe, and the net CARs (contract award CARs 
minus disclosure CARs) for firms which have bribed before/after the FCPA and the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention became effective. We consider firms subject to FCPA jurisdiction as those listed in the U.S. 
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stringent (and more actively enforced than the OECD Convention), we exclude U.S. firms from the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention group. To be classified as enforceable under the FCPA/OECD 
Convention jurisdiction, the bribery must have occurred in a country other than the firm’s country of 
origin. Given that paying bribes domestically has always been illegal, in the last column, we report the 
same statistics for domestic bribery activity. 
We note that we only have up to 5 observations in our sample of U.S. firms that won contracts 
by paying bribes before the enactment of the FCPA. Therefore, these comparisons before/after enactment 
should be interpreted with caution. However, the figures in the table do not provide any conclusive 
evidence that the bribe payments, the benefits that firms receive through them, or the CARs following 
the detection of the bribe are in any way different when comparing the period before and after the 
increase in anti-bribery enforcement. In addition, there are no statistically significant differences for 
firms under the FCPA and the OECD Convention during the period after each became effective. If 
anything, the benefits appear larger following the heightened enforcement. The figures for domestic 
bribes are roughly in line with the remaining figures in the table. Firms bribing domestically earn slightly 
more negative CARs (median of –2.4%) at the bribe disclosure. 
Panels B-C examine whether being under FCPA/OECD Anti-Bribery convention affects the 
bribe NPV and the marginal benefit per dollar of bribe. The comparison group includes firms that pay 
bribes abroad but are from countries not subject to FCPA/OECD Convention jurisdiction, firms that are 
under such jurisdiction but paid bribes before the legislation came into effect, and firms paying bribes 
domestically. The baseline estimated specifications are as in Table 7 Panel A and B respectively. We 
add interactions with indicator variables indicating that the firm is under FCPA or OECD Convention 
jurisdiction. We report only the coefficients of the interaction terms in order to economize on space.  
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The results in Table 10 Panels A and B suggest that anti-corruption enforcement is not 
consistently associated with a reduction of the benefits that firms receive. However, the results in Table 
10 Panel C are conflicting. Firms that pay bribes abroad while under FCPA jurisdiction appear to receive 
larger benefits per dollar of bribe they pay in 1 out of the 3 specifications. In contrast, firms that pay 
bribes abroad while subject to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention appear to receive smaller benefits in 
all 3 specifications.  
Overall, our results suggest that anti-bribery enforcement is not consistently significant in 
reducing the benefits that firms receive from bribery. We caution, however, that our results do not 
suggest that the FCPA/OECD Anti-Bribery Convention have not been successful in curbing bribery 
abroad. These acts may have reduced the frequency of bribery by multinational firms, which may have 
been their original intention. Our data is at the contract level, and our sample selection criteria do not 
make our sample appropriate for testing the frequency of bribery. What our data appear to say is that 
anti-bribery enforcement has not reduced the benefits for those (possibly representing a smaller number) 
U.S./OECD firms that decide to break the law and bribe abroad. An alternative interpretation of the 
results is that anti-bribery enforcement may have been successful in increasing the expected costs of 
bribery (in terms of higher expected probability of detection and higher penalties), and therefore only 
firms with higher net present value projects (i.e. higher benefits) can afford to bribe. In other words, the 
benefits for firms that may be under the jurisdiction of the two Acts, as we estimate them, should be 
large enough to cover the higher expected costs of detection and penalties. 
7. Robustness tests 
In analysis that we do not report in tables, we estimate regressions of detection CARs and net 
CARs using the same explanatory variables as in the rest of the paper, and on additional variables related 
to bribe-paying country characteristics (since enforcement often occurs in the firm’s country of origin). 
- 38 - 
 
We do not obtain any consistently significant results, and therefore we do not report these specifications 
in a table. The only variable that appears consistently significant in explaining the CARs that bribing 
firms earn at the detection of the bribery incident is the contract announcement CAR. This is not 
surprising, since penalties likely depend on the benefits that firms received from these contracts. 
Our study also has several limitations. As noted previously, our sample may be non-random, 
since detection of corruption could be related to firm characteristics, and therefore, it is possible to argue 
that our results may not be generalizable to firms that pay bribes and have not been detected. It is possible 
to argue that there is some endogeneity in detection, firm characteristics, contract characteristics, bribe-
paying and bribe-taking country characteristics.  
To address these issues, we perform a number of robustness tests that we also do not report in 
tables for brevity. First, the descriptive statistics in Table 4 show a large variation in some of our 
measures of the benefits that firms receive from bribes. When we re-estimate our main regressions after 
eliminating the top 5% and the bottom 5% of observations with the largest bribe payments and/or benefits, 
our results are qualitatively similar. We note that our results also appear generally robust when we 
estimate our specifications in smaller sub-samples.  
Second, the selection criteria that we impose may make our sample unrepresentative of the 
general population. In particular, our results may not be generalizable to those derived from survey- and 
clinical-based evidence in the prior literature. We therefore analyze the frequency of observations from 
different countries in our sample. Specifically, we examine whether some countries in our sample are 
represented with a higher or lower frequency than what would be expected based on the size of the 
country and how corrupt that country is perceived to be. Hence, we examine whether our sample 
introduces any obvious bias in our results by giving more/less weight to unrepresentative countries. The 
vast majority of bribe-paying countries appear in our sample with frequencies that do not significantly 
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differ from the expected corruption adjusted frequencies. We conclude that our sample of bribe-paying 
firms does not appear to suffer from any obvious bias relative to what we might expect based on the size 
of these stock markets and perceptions of corruption. 
Third, detection of the bribery by the authorities may not be random but related to observable or 
unobservable firm characteristics (such as firm performance or the quality of corporate governance). 
Consequently, we estimate regressions of the benefits that firms receive on dummy variables for the 
method of detection. Controlling for the method of detection does not affect our results. 
Fourth, the detection of bribery may also be related to firm performance. Under-performing firms 
may be sloppier in hiding the bribe, and more likely to be detected. Alternatively, authorities may go 
after out-performing firms, which are more profitable and can afford to pay larger fines. To the extent 
that firm performance may impact the ability of firms to pay bribes and the benefits that they receive, 
any differences between bribing firms and their peers – especially at the time the bribe is detected by the 
authorities – might again bias our results. Neither of these explanations appear plausible in our sample. 
Table 3 shows that a majority of the firms in the sample were detected from exogenous investigations of 
the bribed politicians, not the firms. In addition, the evidence we reported in Table 5 does not show 
differences in performance between bribing firms and the matched control sample firms at the time the 
bribe was paid. We also estimate logit models of the likelihood of being a bribing firm using the bribe 
paying firms and matched control sample firms at the time the firm was detected. Overall, there is little 
to distinguish bribing from control firms. 
Nonetheless, although our tests do not show the presence of any obvious biases, and for the 
majority of firms in our sample, the detection of the bribe appears to be unrelated to firm characteristics, 
a number of other caveats need to be noted. Our data do not allow us to compare firms that won contracts 
by paying bribes with firms that bid for the same contract and lost, because the latter firms are not 
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disclosed. The contracts that we analyze are for large, complex projects. Although we control for industry 
effects, such controls may be imperfect. However, we do not have enough in-sample and out-of-sample 
observations in order to perform more elaborate matching on contract characteristics. These are 
limitations for any study.  
8. Conclusions 
We analyze a hand-collected sample of 195 prominent bribery cases, involving 131 publicly 
listed firms from 24 stock markets that have been reported to have bribed government officials in 60 
countries worldwide, and were detected during 1975-2015 (for bribes paid during 1971-2010). We focus 
on the initial date of award of the contract for which the bribe was paid.  
We develop 11 hypotheses for factors that determine the benefits that firms receive from bribery. 
We find most robust support for 2 of the 11 hypotheses that we derive from the previous literature, 
namely that the size of bribes is positively correlated with the magnitude of the benefits from the bribery, 
and that benefits are inversely related to information disclosure. We find qualified support for three 
additional hypotheses, that legal enforcement reduces the benefits that firms receive from bribery, that 
regulatory burdens are negatively related to the benefits, and that bribing in more corrupt countries 
increases the benefits. Finally, we find limited or no support for the remaining five hypotheses. 
We also discuss several limitations of our study, mostly arising from the fact that our sample may 
be non-random. Nevertheless, given that our current understanding of corruption is based mostly on 
survey evidence, which may also be subject to numerous biases, our tests may offer useful comparisons 
of theoretical conjectures in the literature. Little empirical evidence exists for these conjectures to date 
against the yardstick of real world data on worldwide bribery by publicly listed firms. 
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Figure 1 
Timeline of events: The example of BAe Systems PLC 
 
To illustrate our empirical methodology, we discuss the example of BAe Systems PLC, a major UK defense company, reported to have been involved in 
widespread bribing of government officials in numerous countries worldwide, resulting in a $400 million settlement on charges of false accounting. The value 
of the contract also reported in news articles was $2.5 billion. We try to match specific bribe payments with specific contracts awarded to the firm at a time 
the bribery was not public knowledge. Our measure of the net benefits that firms receive by paying bribes is the gross benefits (change in total market 





















In 2000, a news agency 
reported that South African 
authorities were 
investigating whether BAE 
paid bribes in the 1999 
Hawk fighter plane deal. In 
June 2003, The Guardian 
newspaper reported further 
allegations on the deal. The 
bribe amount was reported 
to have been $179 million. 
The U.S. Department of Justice 
and the UK Serious Fraud Office 
open a new investigation, leading 
to a $400 million settlement on 
charges of false accounting. In 
one case, it is revealed that BAe 
paid a bribe to Fana Hlongwane, 
special adviser to the late South 
African Defense Minister Joe 
Modise equal to 7% of the 1999 
$2.5 billion contract to supply 
Hawk fighter planes. 
2000 2007 
South African cabinet 
finalizes contract 
details and gives 
definitive go-ahead. 
BAe wins the bid 
and is awarded 
preferred supplier 
status. 
South African Hawk 
fighter aircraft deal is 
rumored as imminent and 
Bae is reported to have 
won 
15 Sep 1999 18 Nov 1998 01 Nov 1998 
Bribe is not public knowledge 
3-day market-
adjusted excess 








returns for BAe 
−1.9% 
Gross Benefit for BAe = $1,484m increase in market capitalization from its value two days before each announcement date respectively 
Net Benefit for BAe = $1,484m − $179m = $1,305m 
Benefit per dollar of bribe = $1,484m / $179m = $8.3 per dollar of bribe 
Share of benefits appropriated by the firm = $1,484m / ($1,484m + $179m) = 89.2% 
Cumulative CARs = 6.1% + 7.6% - 1.9% = 11.8% 
Benefit / Project = $1,484m / $2,500m = 59.4% 
Table 1 
Hypotheses in the previous literature 
The table lists previous studies related to the benefits that firms receive from bribes, their hypotheses, data, and whether these hypotheses are supported in our 
analysis. Some of these studies derive hypotheses about the size of bribes given a certain level of benefits (or the share of the rents captured by corrupt officials). 
In this context, we assume an inverse relationship between the size of bribes and the after-bribery benefits that firms receive. 
Study  Hypothesis Source of data 
(if any) 
Supported in 






     
  Project characteristics:   
Hypothesis 1     
Shleifer and Vishny (1993)  Government officials capture a larger share of the rents from complex 




     
Hypothesis 2     
Jeong and Weiner (2012)  Rents at the contract level are positively related to bribe payments Large sample 
data 
Yes 
     
Hypothesis 3     
Rasmusen and Ramseyer (1994), Bardhan (1997), 
Svensson (2005), D’Souza and Kaufmann (2013) 
 (3a) Competition for the contract dissipates away benefits to firms 






     
  Firm characteristics:   
Hypothesis 4     
Svensson (2003)  More profitable firms are forced to pay larger bribes for a given benefit Survey 
evidence 
No 
     
  Government official characteristics:   
Hypothesis 5     
McMillan and Zoido (2004), Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993), Ades and Di Tella (1999), D’Souza and 
Kaufmann (2013), De Figueiredo and Silverman 
(2006) 
 (5a) Politicians with greater hold-up power receive a larger share of the rents 
(5b) Politicians with greater power to affect decisions can confer greater 







     
  Bribe-taking country-level characteristics:   
Hypothesis 6     





     
Hypothesis 7     
Tullock (1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1993), 
Rasmusen and Ramseyer (1994), Bombardini and 
Trebbi (2011) 
 Democratically elected government officials receive very small bribes 




     
Hypothesis 8     
McMillan and Zoido (2004), Reinikka and 
Svensson (2004, 2005), Olken (2007), D’Souza and 
Kaufmann (2013), Banerjee, Hanna, Kyle, Olken, 
and Sumarto (2018) 







     
Hypothesis 9     




     
Hypothesis 10     
D’Souza and Kaufmann (2013)  Benefits are smaller in countries with better government effectiveness Survey 
evidence 
Yes 
     
Hypothesis 11     
D’Souza and Kaufmann (2013)  Benefits are smaller in countries with better anti-bribery enforcement Survey 
evidence 
No 




Countries, industries, and government officials 
The table lists the countries of origin and the industries of the bribing firms, the countries where the bribery was committed, and the positions of the government 
officials bribed. Our sample of 195 observations is constructed by searching official documents that report corruption cases (Transparency International 
OECD Anti-Corruption Convention Progress Reports 2007-2009, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) litigation, enforcement, and complaints 
releases, U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) documents pertaining to violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), United Kingdom's Serious Fraud 
Office website), and news reports in Lexis-Nexis and Factiva for bribes that were detected during 1975-2015 (these bribes were actually paid during 1971-
2010). To be included in the sample, we must be able to determine the initial announcement date of the contract or event for which the bribe was paid, and 
the amount of the bribe. Observations are at the contract level. The industrial classification follows the Fama-French 12-industry classification. 
 
Country of the government official bribed  Country of origin of the bribing 
firm 
 Industry Position of the government official 
bribed 
      
Japan 25 USA 57 Consumer Non-Durables (Food, Tobacco, 
Textiles) 
6 Head of State 
 
25





10 France 23 Manufacturing (Machinery, Trucks, 
Planes) 
39 Member of Parliament/Party  18





7 UK 17 Chemicals and Allied Products 3 Head of Government Agency 25
Philippines, South Africa 
 
6 South Korea 7 Business Equipment (Computers, 
Software, and Electronic Equipment 
31 Military 9
Greece, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore 5 Italy 5 Telephone and Television Transmission) 
 
8 Judge 6
Mexico, Russia, Taiwan, Thailand, USA, 
Venezuela 
4 Netherlands, Switzerland 4 Utilities  2 Other Official 31
Angola, Bangladesh, Egypt, Italy, 
Kazakhstan 
3 Austria, Hungary, Norway, 
Sweden 
3 Wholesale & Retail  10 Unidentified Official 53
Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Iran, Israel, Poland, Slovakia, 
Spain 
 
2 China, South Africa 2 Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 8  
Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, 
Cambodia, East Timor, Ecuador, Gabon, 
Germany, Ghana, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, 
Malaysia, Mozambique, Pakistan, Panama, 
Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Serbia, 
Suriname, Tanzania, Trinidad & Tobago, 
Uganda, Zambia 
1 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, 
Chile, Hong Kong, Mexico, 
Spain, Taiwan, Thailand 
1 Finance 
 
Other – of which: 











How the bribery was revealed to authorities 
 
The table reports how the bribery was revealed to authorities (the detailed sources appear in the Appendix). Our sample of 195 observations 
is constructed by searching official documents that report corruption cases (Transparency International OECD Anti-Corruption Convention 
Progress Reports 2007-2009, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) litigation, enforcement, and complaints releases, U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) documents pertaining to violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), United Kingdom's Serious 
Fraud Office website), and news reports in Lexis-Nexis and Factiva for bribes that were detected during 1975-2015 (these bribes were actually 
paid during 1971-2010). To be included in the sample, we must be able to determine the initial announcement date of the contract or event for 
which the bribe was paid, and the amount of the bribe. 
 
Method of detection (% of 
sample) 
  
Investigations of politicians or government officials (32%) 
Spin-off from unrelated or third party investigation (19%) 
Voluntary disclosure by company (14%) 
Investigations by the press (7%) 
Whistleblowers (7%) 
Exogenous change in enforcement (6%) 









The table reports descriptive statistics for a sample of 195 observations constructed by searching official documents that report corruption 
cases (Transparency International OECD Anti-Corruption Convention Progress Reports 2007-2009, U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) litigation, enforcement, and complaints releases, U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) documents pertaining to violations of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), United Kingdom's Serious Fraud Office website), and news reports in Lexis-Nexis and Factiva for 
bribes that were detected during 1975-2015 (these bribes were actually paid during 1971-2010). To be included in the sample, we must be 
able to determine the initial announcement date of the contract or event for which the bribe was paid, and the amount of the bribe. The sample 
selection process is explained in Table 2, and variable definitions appear in the Appendix. In the titles of country level variables, “BT” indicates 
bribe-taking country while “BP” indicates bribe-paying country. 






  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
        
A. Bribe characteristics        
Bribe (USD, 2005) 195 $20,953,081 $45,604,385  $443,067 $4,083,144 $15,121,477 
Bribe / Project size 79 4.6% 6.8%  0.8% 2.6% 5.2% 
Bribe / BT GDP per capita 195 23,442 90,445  97 1,259 5,324 
Bribe / BP GDP per capita 195 933 2,139  14 150 660 
Bribe / Book Value of Equity 165 6.1% 53.3%  0.0% 0.1% 0.7% 
Bribe / Total Assets 165 1.1% 8.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 
Bribe / EBIT 107 26.2% 243.2%  0.0% 0.2% 1.6% 
Bribe / Share 178 $0.95 $4.91  $0.00 $0.01 $0.15 
        
B. Project characteristics        
Project size (USD mil, 2005) 79 $2,270 $5,660  $43.8 $200 $883 
        
C. Benefits        
CAR [-1,+1] All announcements 195  +0.7% 7.4%  -1.9% +0.3% +3.1% 
CAR [-1,+1] Contract award announcement date only 195 +1.0% 6.3%  -1.8% +0.6% +3.1% 
CAR [0] Contract award announcement date only 195 +1.1% 5.3%  -1.4% +0.3% +2.4% 
Gross Benefit: Cumulative Change in Market Cap 
(USD mil, 2005) 
195  $143 $1,790  -$104 $1.8 $196 
Gross Benefit / Total Rents 195  44.6% 46.3%  0.2% 10.7% 89.3% 
Gross Benefit / Project Size 79 -334.0% 2,810.8%  -55.5% -0.1% 17.0% 
Bribe Profitability index (Gross Benefit / Bribe) 195  $3,408.1 $38,393.4  -$29.9 $0.12 $44.4 
Bribe NPV (Gross Benefit – Bribe (USD mil, 2005)) 195  $122 $1,790  -$129 -$3.8 $166 
        
D. Detection        
CAR [-1,+1] 127 -1.9% 5.4%  -1.9% -1.3% 0.5% 
        
Net CAR (=CAR [-1,+1] All announcements – 
Detection CAR [-1,+1]) 
127 -1.0% 8.7%  -4.9 -1.1% 2.4% 







Firm performance comparisons of sample firms to their peers 
The table reports the estimates from logit models of the likelihood that a firm is included in our final sample (i) compared to our initial sample 
of 737 firms that have paid bribes but for which we cannot identify exact contract dates or bribe amounts (Column 1), ii) compared to our 
initial sample of 737 firms that have paid bribes for which we cannot identify exact contract dates but we can identify bribe amounts (Column 
2) and (iii) relative to a control sample matched by country, industry, size, price-to-book ratio without bribery incidents (Column 3) on firm 
performance characteristics. The sample selection procedure is explained in Table 2, and variable definitions appear in the Appendix. 
Intercepts and fixed effects are estimated but not reported. Significance levels in parentheses (p-values) are based on Huber-White 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.  ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  
 
 
Bribing firms included in the final 
sample vs. bribing firms included 
in the initial sample  
Bribing firms included in the final 
sample vs. bribing firms included 
in the initial sample  
Bribing firms vs. 
matched control 
firms 
 =1 if firm is included in the final 
sample 
=1 if firm is included in the final 
sample 
=1 if firm is a  
bribing firm 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Return on equity (ROE) year(-1) 0.1243 (0.926) 0.9730 (0.511) 0.0508 (0.919) 
Operating profit margin (OPM) year(-1) -2.5604 (0.174) -3.7694 (0.090)* -0.5816 (0.263) 
Asset turnover (ATO) year(-1) 0.5111 (0.178) 0.5839 (0.171) -0.8266 (0.001)*** 
Market-to-book ratio (MB) year(-1) -0.0006 (0.322) -0.0005 (0.334) 0.0054 (0.951) 
Debt-Equity ratio (DE) year(-1) -0.0832 (0.213) -0.1146 (0.155) 0.0300 (0.764) 
Sales growth year(-3,-1) -0.0157 (0.012)** -0.0173 (0.029)** 0.2350 (0.576) 
Log(Sales) year(-1) 0.0449 (0.466) 0.0694 (0.308) 0.8831 (0.000)*** 
Log(Bribe)  0.1674 (0.052)*  
    
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
McFadden R2 0.16 0.25 0.23 
Observations 309 269 362 
Table 6 
What benefits do firms receive by paying bribes? 
The table reports ordinary least squares regressions of the gross benefit that firms receive by paying a bribe on the magnitude of the bribe. Sample selection 
is explained in Table 2, and variable definitions appear in the Appendix. Panel A reports results for the entire sample baseline specifications using unscaled 
variables. Panel B reports regressions using unscaled variables, and additional control variables. Panel C reports results using scaled variables. Anticipation 
controls are variables correlated with the probability that the contract award and/or the bribe payment has been anticipated by the market (whether the contract 
resulted from competitive tender, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index in the bribe-taking country, whether the firm has been publicly 
detected paying bribes before, whether the firm is known to have won contracts by paying bribes in the same country before even if this was not public 
knowledge at the time). Performance controls are bribing firm ROE, operating profit margin, asset turnover, market-to-book ratio, and debt-equity ratio at 
the last fiscal year before the contract award. Additional controls in some specification include dummy variables for the payment of domestic bribes, whether 
the firm is subject to the provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in the U.S. (U.S. firms and firms listed in the U.S. while the FCPA has been 
in force which have paid bribes in foreign countries), and whether the firm is subject to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (OECD member firms which 
have paid bribes in foreign countries while the Convention has been in force in the respective countries). Consortia fixed effects are for companies that bribe 
as part of a consortium. A time trend is included to control for changes in enforcement (which has become more stringent) over time. Some specifications are 
based on CARs around contract award announcement dates only (excluding rumours and other related announcements, such as agreement ratifications etc), 
while others are based on day=0 announcement CARs. All variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Intercepts, fixed effects, and coefficients on 
some control variables are estimated but not reported. Significance levels in parentheses (p-values) are based on White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent 
standard errors clustered at the country level.  ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
.  
  
Panel A. Baseline specifications with unscaled variables 
 All Bribes All Bribes All Bribes All Bribes All Bribes 







(USD 2005)  
[based on contract award 




[based on contract award 
announcement day [0] CARs] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Bribe (USD 2005) 6.0801 (0.015)** 7.4455 (0.009)*** 8.3653 (0.002)*** 4.1168 (0.009)*** 3.0345 (0.017)** 
Sales (USD 2005)   0.0042 (0.488) 0.0061 (0.215) 0.0001 (0.981) 
      
Anticipation controls No No No No No 
Industry fixed effects No No No No No 
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Performance controls No No No No No 
Domestic bribe, FCPA, 
OECD Anti-bribery Act 
indicators 
No No No No No 
Consortia fixed effects No No No No No 
Time trend No No No No No 
      
R2 0.05 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.27 
Observations 195 195 172 172 172 
Panel B. Baseline specifications with unscaled variables and additional control variables 
 
 All Bribes All Bribes All Bribes All Bribes 








 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Bribe (USD 2005) 9.0321 (0.016)** 6.3372 (0.052)* 4.9341 (0.045)** 6.2751 (0.095)* 
Sales (USD 2005) 0.0052 (0.251) 0.0088 (0.077)* 0.0029 (0.377) -0.0003 (0.996) 
Project size (USD 2005)   0.0011 (0.951) -0.0036 (0.827) 
     
Anticipation controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes No No 
Performance controls No Yes No No 
Domestic bribe, FCPA, OECD Anti-bribery Act indicators No Yes No Yes 
Consortia fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Time trend No Yes Yes Yes 
     
R2 0.41 0.56 0.29 0.48 
Observations 172 154 71 71 




Panel C. Scaled variables 
 All Bribes All Bribes All Bribes All Bribes 
Dependent variable Gross benefit 
(USD 2005) / 
Total Assets 
Gross benefit 
(USD 2005) / 
Book Value of 
Equity 
Gross benefit 
(USD 2005) / 
EBIT 
Gross benefit 
(USD 2005) / 
Share 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     




   





Bribe (USD 2005) / EBIT 
 
  1.4892 
(0.026)** 
 
Bribe (USD 2005) / Share 
 
   4.9476 
(0.036)** 
     
Log Sales (USD 2005) 0.0128   
(0.191) 
0.0285   
(0.148) 
0.3132   
(0.447) 
0.4537   
(0.714) 
     
Anticipation controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Performance controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Domestic bribe, FCPA, OECD Anti-bribery Act Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Consortia fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
R2 0.60 0.71 0.48 0.75 
Observations 143 143 143 142 
     
Table 7 
What explains the net benefits that firms receive by paying bribes? 
The table reports ordinary least squares regressions of the net benefit (bribe NPV; Panel A) and on the marginal benefit (Panel B) that firms 
receive from paying the bribe on bribing firm performance characteristics, rank of government officials that received the bribe, proxies ease 
of detection, and country level governance. Sample selection is explained in Table 2, and variable definitions appear in the Appendix. In the 
titles of country level variables, “BT” indicates bribe-taking country. The regressions in Panel B are based on the specification of Table 5, 
Panel C, Column 1 but only the interaction terms are reported in order to economize on space. Anticipation controls are variables correlated 
with the probability that the contract award and/or the bribe payment has been anticipated by the market (whether the contract resulted from 
competitive tender, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index in the bribe-taking country, whether the firm has been publicly 
detected paying bribes before, whether the firm is known to have won contracts by paying bribes in the same country before even if this was 
not public knowledge at the time). Performance controls are bribing firm ROE, operating profit margin, asset turnover, market-to-book ratio, 
and debt-equity ratio at the last fiscal year before the contract award. Additional controls in some specification include dummy variables for 
the payment of domestic bribes, whether the firm is subject to the provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in the U.S. (U.S. 
firms and firms listed in the U.S. while the FCPA has been in force which have paid bribes in foreign countries), and whether the firm is 
subject to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (OECD member firms which have paid bribes in foreign countries while the Convention has 
been in force in the respective countries). Consortia fixed effects are for companies that bribe as part of a consortium. A time trend is included 
to control for changes in enforcement (which has become more stringent) over time. Some specifications are based on CARs of contract award 
announcement only (excluding rumours and other related announcements, such as agreement ratifications etc), while others are based on 
day=0 announcement CARs. All variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. In Panel A, Column 1 the reported coefficients have been 
scaled by 10-6. Significance levels in parentheses (p-values) are based on White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors clustered 










(USD 2005) / 
Total Assets  
 
Bribe NPV 
(USD 2005) / 
Total Assets  




(USD 2005) / 
Total Assets 
[based on contract 
award announcement 
day [0] CARs] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Disclosure variables     
Public Disclosure of Politicians’ Income -758.0 (0.062)* -0.0714 (0.015)** -0.0353 (0.766) -0.0512 (0.027)** 
     
Country-specific political factors     
(Lack of) Legal efficiency in BT country 28.11 (0.618) 0.0010 (0.777) 0.0115 (0.457) 0.0022 (0.570) 
Democracy score in BT country -3.680 (0.806) 0.0008 (0.439) 0.0029 (0.094)* 0.0001 (0.987) 
Customs burden in BT country -63.0 (0.259) -0.0007 (0.783) -0.0107 (0.421) -0.0026 (0.352) 
     
Firm- and contract-specific factors     
High-ranking politician 64.91 (0.725) 0.0104 (0.308) 0.0423 (0.272) 0.0071 (0.426) 
Abnormal ROE year(-1) 166.0 (0.601) 0.0038 (0.888) 0.0276 (0.263) -0.0026 (0.894) 
Complex project -362.0 (0.301) -0.0138 (0.620) -0.1293 (0.290) 0.0007 (0.981) 
Log(Sales) year(-1) -3.732 (0.969) 0.0073 (0.288) 0.0090 (0.335) 0.0072 (0.353) 
     
Proxies for ex ante perception of bribery     
Firm previously detected paying bribes -726.0 (0.458) -0.0141 (0.623) 0.0275 (0.529) -0.0042 (0.818) 
Number of previous contracts in country 283.0 (0.214) 0.0117 (0.319) 0.0163 (0.390) 0.0038 (0.663) 
Transparency International (10-CPI) -77.0 (0.353) -0.0004 (0.848) -0.0007 (0.932) 0.0015 (0.603) 
Non-competitive bid for specific project -299.0 (0.605) -0.0319 (0.045)** 0.0128 (0.691) -0.0161 (0.261) 
Domestic bribe indicator -295.0 (0.248) 0.0043 (0.802) -0.0270 (0.531) 0.0048 (0.697) 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Consortia fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.64 0.29 0.15 0.28 
Observations 144 134 134 134 
Panel B. Marginal benefit per dollar of bribe 
 All Bribes All Bribes All Bribes 
Dependent variable Gross benefit 
(USD 2005) / 
Total Assets  
 
Gross benefit 
 (USD 2005) / 
Total Assets  
[based on contract 
award announcement 
day [-1,+1] CARs] 
Gross benefit 
 (USD 2005) / 
Total Assets 
[based on contract award 
announcement day [0] 
CARs] 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
(Bribe (USD 2005) / Total Assets) × Public Disclosure of Politicians’ Income -3.7906 (0.532) -8.3758 (0.167) -7.5053 (0.341) 
(Bribe (USD 2005) / Total Assets) × (Lack of) Legal efficiency in BT country 2.2714 (0.070)* 3.0579 (0.056)* 3.6113 (0.143) 
(Bribe (USD 2005) / Total Assets) × Democracy score in BT country 0.0621 (0.780) 0.0579 (0.783) 0.0661 (0.755) 
(Bribe (USD 2005) / Total Assets) × Customs burden in BT country -1.0630 (0.058)* -1.9272 (0.010)*** -2.1652 (0.081)* 
(Bribe (USD 2005) / Total Assets) × High-ranking politician 2.1052 (0.234) 3.1260 (0.029)** 3.6364 (0.013)** 
(Bribe (USD 2005) / Total Assets) × Abnormal ROE year(-1) 1.6026 (0.701) 0.2493 (0.948) -1.3048 (0.705) 
    
Specification in Table 6, Panel C, Column 1 Yes Yes Yes 
Anticipation controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Performance controls Yes Yes Yes 
Domestic bribe, FCPA, OECD Anti-bribery Act indicators Yes Yes Yes 
Consortia fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time trend Yes Yes Yes 
    
R2 0.49 0.50 0.56 
Observations 129 129 129 




Does the size of bribes and the magnitude of benefits differ in democratic countries? 
The table reports univariate comparisons of medians of the size of bribes and of the benefit that firms receive from paying the bribe on bribing 
in sub-sample of democratic and non-democratic countries. The Polity IV democracy index takes values from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full 
democracy). In Table 8, Panel A we classify countries as democratic if the index value for the specific country is greater than 0 and as non-
democratic if the value of the index is less than or equal to 0. In the remaining panels of Table 8, we define democratic countries as those with 
index values in the [+7, +10] range (Panel B) or USA/European Union/European Free Trade Association members (Panel C), and we define 
non-democratic countries as those with index values in the [-7, -10] range. Number of observations for each measure (N) is reported in brackets. 
Significance levels in parentheses (p-values) are based on the Mann-Whitney test for differences in medians. ***, **, * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
Panel A. Democratic v Non-democratic bribe-taking countries (medians) 







 (1) (2) (4) 
    
Bribe (USD 2005, mil) 2.2 [N=125] 5.1 [N=69] (0.038)** 
Bribe/BT country GDP per capita 870 [N=125] 1,651 [N=69] (0.000)*** 
Bribe/Project 3.0% [N=43] 1.0% [N=36] (0.052)* 
    
Gross Benefit (USD 2005, mil) 1.8 [N=125] 1.9 [N=69] (0.896) 
Benefit/Total rents 38.2% [N=125] 10.7% [N=69] (0.429) 
Benefit/Project -0.9% [N=43] 0.5% [N=36] (0.526) 
Bribe NPV (USD 2005, mil) -2.5 [N=125] -5.9 [N=69] (0.843) 
Bribe Profitability Index 62.0 [N=125] 12.0 [N=69] (0.728) 
    
Panel B. Highest democracy score v Highest autocracy score bribe-taking countries  
 Democratic  
bribe-taking countries  
Democracy score [7, 10] 
Non-democratic  
bribe-taking countries 




 (1) (2) (4) 
    
Bribe (USD 2005, mil) 1.7 [N=99] 2.0 [N=36] (0.399) 
Bribe/BT country GDP per capita 395 [N=99] 1,427 [N=36] (0.001)*** 
Bribe/Project 2.8%  [N=34] 0.4% [N=21] (0.002)*** 
    
Gross Benefit (USD 2005, mil) 4.0 [N=99] 4.5 [N=36] (0.852) 
Benefit/Total rents 52.9% [N=99] 55.6% [N=36] (0.532) 
Benefit/Project -0.4% [N=34] 0.7% [N=21] (0.856) 
Bribe NPV (USD 2005, mil) 0.8 [N=99] 0.2 [N=36] (0.833) 
Bribe Profitability Index 1.1 [N=99] 1.3 [N=36] (0.539) 
    
 
Panel C. US/EU v Highest autocracy score bribe-taking countries 









 (1) (2) (4) 
    
Bribe (USD 2005, mil) 11.4 [N=19] 1.6 [N=36] (0.232) 
Bribe/BT country GDP per capita 913 [N=19] 1,411 [N=36] (0.065)* 
Bribe/Project 3.1% [N=9] 0.4% [N=21] (0.036)** 
    
Gross Benefit (USD 2005, mil) 1.8 [N=19] 6.8 [N=36] (0.526) 
Benefit/Total rents 47.4% [N=19] 61.1% [N=36] (0.587) 
Benefit/Project -5.5% [N=9] 0.8% [N=21] (0.724) 
Bribe NPV (USD 2005, mil) -2.7 [N=19] 0.4 [N=36] (0.426) 
Bribe Profitability Index 0.9 [N=19] 1.6[ N=36] (0.587) 
    
Table 9 
Do the drivers of benefits differ in democratic countries? 
 
The table reports ordinary least squares regressions of the net benefit that firms receive from paying the bribe (bribe NPV) on bribing firm 
performance characteristics, rank of government officials that received the bribe, proxies ease of detection, and country level governance. 
Columns 1-2 report estimates for a sub-sample of democratic countries, and Columns 3-4 report estimates for a sub-sample of non-democratic 
countries. The Polity IV democracy index takes values from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy). We classify countries as democratic 
if the index value for the specific country is greater than 0 and as non-democratic if the value of the index is less than or equal to 0. Sample 
selection is explained in Table 2, and variable definitions appear in the Appendix. In the titles of country level variables, “BT” indicates bribe-
taking country. Intercepts and industry fixed effects are estimated but not reported. In columns 1 and 3 the reported coefficients have been 
scaled by 10-6. Significance levels in parentheses (p-values) are based on White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors clustered 
at the country level.  ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
  






(USD 2005) / 
Total Assets  
 Bribe NPV 
(USD 2005) 
Bribe NPV 
(USD 2005) / 
Total Assets 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Disclosure variables      
Public Disclosure of Politicians’ Income -1080 (0.065)* -0.0794 (0.025)**  -24.20 (0.683) 0.0961 (0.359) 
      
Country-specific political factors      
(Lack of) Legal efficiency in BT country 75.52 (0.373) -0.0019 (0.618)  3.274 (0.308) -0.0003 (0.974) 
Democracy score in BT country 79.57 (0.405) -0.0009 (0.818)  -0.945 (0.434) -0.0049 (0.350) 
Customs burden in BT country -68.00 (0.313) -0.0007 (0.797)  -774.0 (0.103) 0.0023 (0.786) 
      
Firm- and contract-specific factors      
High-ranking politician -149.0 (0.642) -0.0067 (0.632)  19.80 (0.401) 0.0535 (0.083)* 
Abnormal ROE year(-1) 451.0 (0.308) 0.0167 (0.720)  -35.30 (0.257) -0.0278 (0.258) 
Complex project -611.0 (0.167) 0.0226 (0.353)  -52.30 (0.052)* -0.0743 (0.126) 
Log(Sales) year(-1) 43.00 (0.779) 0.0083 (0.320)  0.720 (0.773) 0.0011 (0.945) 
      
Proxies for ex ante perception of bribery      
Firm previously detected paying bribes -826.0 (0.376) -0.0413 (0.278)  20.00 (0.000)*** 0.0505 (0.398) 
Number of previous contracts in country 96.85 (0.747) 0.0068 (0.662)  7.363 (0.477) -0.0004 (0.985) 
Transparency International (10-CPI) -171.0 (0.229) -0.0008 (0.903)  75.12 (0.009)*** 0.0001 (0.986) 
Non-competitive bid for specific project 98.89 (0.872) -0.0316 (0.132)  -142.0 (0.000)*** -0.1098 (0.091)* 
Domestic bribe -788.0 (0.072)* 0.0054 (0.771)    
      
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Consortia fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Time trend Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
      
R2 0.68 0.35  0.75 0.46 
Observations 107 101  37 33 
 
Table 10 
Does anti-bribery enforcement matter? FCPA and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention  
The table reports comparisons of the size of bribes and the benefits that bribing firms receive between firms subject to the FCPA and to the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Panel A reports univariate comparisons based on medians. Panel B reports ordinary least squares regressions 
of the net benefit that firms receive from paying the bribe (bribe NPV) and of bribe characteristics on bribing firm performance characteristics, 
rank of government officials that received the bribe, proxies ease of detection, and country level governance. The tests are based on the 
specifications of Table 6, Panel A but only FCPA and OECD variables are reported in order to economize on space. Panel C reports ordinary 
least squares regressions of the marginal benefit that firms receive from paying the bribe and of bribe characteristics on bribing firm 
performance characteristics, rank of government officials that received the bribe, proxies ease of detection, and country level governance. The 
tests are based on the specifications of Table 6, Panel B but only FCPA and OECD interaction variables are reported in order to economize 
on space. Sample selection is explained in Table 2, and variable definitions appear in the Appendix. In the titles of country level variables, 
“BT” indicates bribe-taking country, and “BP” indicates bribe-paying country. Anticipation controls are variables correlated with the 
probability that the contract award and/or the bribe payment has been anticipated by the market (whether the contract resulted from competitive 
tender, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index in the bribe-taking country, whether the firm has been publicly detected 
paying bribes before, whether the firm is known to have won contracts by paying bribes in the same country before even if this was not public 
knowledge at the time). Performance controls are bribing firm ROE, operating profit margin, asset turnover, market-to-book ratio, and debt-
equity ratio at the last fiscal year before the contract award. Additional controls in some specification include dummy variables for the payment 
of domestic bribes, whether the firm is subject to the provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in the U.S. (U.S. firms and firms 
listed in the U.S. while the FCPA has been in force which have paid bribes in foreign countries), and whether the firm is subject to the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention (OECD member firms which have paid bribes in foreign countries while the Convention has been in force in the 
respective countries). Consortia fixed effects are for companies that bribe as part of a consortium. A time trend is included to control for 
changes in enforcement (which has become more stringent) over time. Some specifications are based on CARs of contract award 
announcement only (excluding rumours and other related announcements, such as agreement ratifications etc), while others are based on 
day=0 announcement CARs. All variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. In Panel B, column 1, the reported coefficients have been 
scaled by 10-6. Significance levels in parentheses (p-values) are based on the Mann-Whitney test for differences in medians (Panel A), and 
White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors clustered at the bribe-taking country level (Panel B and Panel C). ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
  
Panel A. Comparison of the magnitude of benefits 
 
 FCPA firms (U.S. listed 
firms) 
(foreign bribes paid 
before/after 1978) 
 OECD Anti-bribery 
Convention Firms (excl. U.S.) 
(foreign bribes paid 
before/after date Convention 
became effective) 






 Before After p-value  
(diff in 
medians) 
 Before After p-value  
(diff in 
medians) 




 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
            
Bribe (USD 2005, mil) 44.3 5.5 (0.034)**  11.4 7.1 (0.380)  (0.789)  19.4 
Bribe / Total Assets 0.4% 0.0% (0.351)  0.1% 0.0% (0.010)***  (0.197)  0.0% 
Bribe/BT country GDP per capita 38,085 1,734 (0.050)**  2,106 1,837 (0.567)  (0.343)  6.2 
Bribe/Project 1.9% 2.7% (0.584)  1.1% 3.1% (0.078)*  (0.320)  3.0% 
            
Gross Benefit (USD 2005, mil) 6.8 4.1 (0.658)  -8.2 24.6 (0.391)  (0.868)  4.0 
Benefit/Total rents 10.7% 38.5% (0.961)  0.0% 52.9% (0.037)**  (0.495)  78.8% 
Bribe NPV (USD 2005, mil) -50.2 -2.5 (0.825)  -18.9 3.4 (0.346)  (0.795)  4.0 
            
Contract CAR [-1,+1] +3.7% +0.5% (0.310)  -0.3% +0.8% (0.226)  (0.612)  0.06% 
Detection CAR [-1,+1] -1.8% -0.7% (0.579)  -1.0% -1.3% (0.769)  (0.728)  -2.4% 
Net CAR [-1,+1] +0.3% -1.0% (0.729)  -2.0% +0.4% (0.182)  (0.650)  -1.6% 
            
Observations 1-5 37-81   29-58 12-37     4-39 
            






(USD 2005) / 
Total Assets  
 
Bribe NPV 
(USD 2005) / 
Total Assets  




(USD 2005) / 
Total Assets 
[based on contract 
award 
announcement day 0 
CARs] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Foreign Bribe × FCPA Firm 325.0 (0.361) 0.0282 (0.210) 0.0586 (0.237) 0.0317 (0.193) 
Foreign Bribe × OECD Anti-Bribery 189.0 (0.564) 0.0053 (0.824) 0.0285 (0.357) 0.0094 (0.518) 
     
Specification in Table 7, Panel A Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Anticipation controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Performance controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Domestic bribe Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Consortia fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
R2 0.64 0.31 0.16 0.30 
Observations 144 134 134 134 
Panel C. Marginal benefit per dollar of bribe 
 All Bribes All Bribes All Bribes 
Dependent variable Gross benefit 
(USD 2005) / 
Total Assets  
 
Gross benefit 
 (USD 2005) / 
Total Assets  




 (USD 2005) / 
Total Assets 
[based on contract award 
announcement day 0 
CARs] 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
(Bribe (USD 2005) / Total Assets) × Foreign Bribe × FCPA Firm 
 
4.6725 (0.000)*** 2.7222 (0.122) 2.2147 (0.117) 
(Bribe (USD 2005) / Total Assets) × Foreign Bribe × OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention Firm 
-5.8654  (0.000)*** -4.9007 (0.001)*** -6.3652 (0.000)*** 
    
Specification of Table 7, Panel B Yes Yes Yes 
Anticipation controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Performance controls Yes Yes Yes 
Domestic bribe, FCPA, OECD Anti-bribery indicators Yes Yes Yes 
Consortia fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time trend Yes Yes Yes 
    
R2 0.52 0.52 0.61 
Observations 129 129 129 





Table A.1. Sample observations by year 
 
 
Year Initial bribery sample from 
official documents that report 
corruption cases 
Cases with identifiable 
announcement of the 
contract award for which 
the bribe was paid 
Cases in final sample 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
1969 1 1 0 
1970 0 0 0 
1971 1 1 1 
1972 1 1 1 
1973 0 0 0 
1974 2 2 2 
1975 0 0 0 
1976 2 0 0 
1977 0 0 0 
1978 0 0 0 
1979 1 0 0 
1980 1 1 1 
1981 2 2 2 
1982 1 1 1 
1983 0 0 0 
1984 3 3 2 
1985 4 4 2 
1986 5 5 4 
1987 2 2 1 
1988 2 2 1 
1989 9 9 5 
1990 10 10 6 
1991 14 14 10 
1992 13 13 10 
1993 22 8 6 
1994 9 9 7 
1995 24 23 15 
1996 7 7 7 
1997 9 9 9 
1998 36 20 11 
1999 24 16 11 
2000 21 21 15 
2001 28 28 16 
2002 28 15 6 
2003 24 20 15 
2004 29 10 7 
2005 23 10 6 
2006 18 8 5 
2007 6 6 3 
2008 10 6 4 
2009 9 2 2 
2010 19 3 1 
2011 8 0 0 
2012 5 0 0 
2013 1 0 0 
    
Total 433 291 195 






Table A.2. Definition, measurement and sources of data for the variables used in the analysis 
 
Variable  Variable definition Source of data 
   
A. Benefits   
Contract CARs [-1,+1] CARs summed over all relevant contract announcements. CARs are 
estimated as the difference between daily raw returns (with dividends re-invested) 
and the return of the stock market index of the country where the firm is listed. 
Alternative specifications use CARs of contract award announcement CARs only 
(excluding rumors and other related announcements, such as agreement ratifications), 
or Day=0 CARs. 
CRSP, Compustat, Datastream, 
PACAP database, and Factset. 
Exchange rates and GDP deflators 
are obtained from International 
Financial Statistics (IFS). 
Detection CARs [-1,+1] CARs around the bribery revelation date. CARs are estimated as the 
difference between daily raw returns (with dividends re-invested) and the return of 
the stock market index of the country where the firm is listed. 
Net CARs Difference between Contract CARs and Detection CARs 
Gross Benefit (USD 2005) [-1,+1] Contract CAR times firm market capitalization summed over all relevant 
contract announcements in constant 2005 USD.  
Bribe NPV  Gross Benefit minus the bribe payment 
Bribe Profitability Index Gross Benefit divided by the bribe payment 
Benefit/Total rents The ratio of the Gross Benefit divided by the sum of the bribe payment plus the 
larger of the Gross Benefit or zero. 
Benefit/Project Gross Benefit divided by contract size 
   
B. Bribe characteristics   
Bribe (USD 2005) The bribe payment in constant 2005 USD (using exchange rates at the announcement 
date and the U.S. GDP deflator). 
Transparency International’s OECD 
Anti-Corruption Convention 
Progress Reports, U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission 
litigation, enforcement, and 
complaints releases, U.S. 
Department of Justice documents 
pertaining to violations of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA), UK Serious Fraud Office 
website, news sources search.  
 
Project size (USD 2005) The size of the project (or contract), obtained from the reports/press articles that are 
the source of the bribe information and/or articles announcing the contract award. All 
values are expressed in constant 2005 USD. 
Bribe/Project Bribe payment divided by contract size 
Complex project Contract involves defense, construction or engineering projects. 
High-ranking government 
official 
The recipient of the bribe is Head of state (president, prime-minister), government 
minister, member of parliament, or a political party 
 
   
C. Anticipation controls   
Corruption perceptions index 
(CPI) 
The original scores range from 0-10 with higher values corresponding to less 
corruption. To make the interpretation more intuitive, we express the score as 10 
minus the country’s raw score. Therefore, in our specifications, 0 represents no 
corruption and 10 highest corruption. 
Transparency International 
(www.transparency.org) 
Non-competitive bid Contract award is not the result of competitive tender. It applies to the granting of 
certain licenses, tax favors, and judicial favors. 
Transparency International’s OECD 
Anti-Corruption Convention 
Progress Reports, U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission 
litigation, enforcement, and 
complaints releases, U.S. 
Department of Justice documents 
pertaining to violations of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA), UK Serious Fraud Office 
website, news sources search. 
Firm previously detected 
paying bribes 
The bribing firm has been reported to have paid bribes in this or another country 
before the award of the current contract.  
Number of previous contracts 
with bribes in country 
Number of previous contracts (including current contract) won by the firm in the 
same country by paying bribes. For example, it takes the value 1 for the 1st contract 
in the country for which the firm has paid a bribe, 2 for the 2nd etc.. These have been 
awarded but it is not publicly known at the time of the award that the company paid 
bribes for them. 
   
D. Firm performance   
Abnormal Return on equity 
(ROE) 
Net income divided by shareholders’ equity for year -1 relative to the contract 




CRSP, Compustat, Datastream, the 
PACAP database, and Factset. 
Exchange rates and GDP deflators 
are obtained from International 
Financial Statistics (IFS). 
Abnormal Operating profit 
margin (OPM) 
Operating income divided by sales for year -1 relative to the contract announcement 
(difference between bribing and matched control firm). 
Abnormal Asset turnover 
(ATO) 
Sales divided by total assets for year -1 relative to the contract announcement  
(difference between bribing and matched control firm). 
Abnormal Market-to-book ratio 
(MB) 
Market capitalization divided by shareholders’ equity for year -1 relative to the 
contract announcement (difference between bribing and matched control firm). 
Abnormal Debt-Equity ratio 
(DE) 
Total debt divided by shareholders’ equity for year -1 relative to the contract 
announcement (difference between bribing and matched control firm). 
Sales (USD 2005) Sales in constant 2005 USD for year -1 relative to the contract announcement. 
   
E. Other variables   
Public disclosure of politicians’ 
sources of income 
From 0 (no disclosure) to 1 (full disclosure)  Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de 
Silanes, and Shleifer (2010) 
Democracy score 
 
From +10 (full democracy) to −10 (full autocracy)  Polity IV project 
(www.systemicpeace.org) 
Customs burden, Legal 
efficiency 
From 1 (highest standards) to 10 (lowest standards). We express the raw scores from 
the report as deciles across all countries with scores in the report, with decile 1 
representing highest standards and decile 10 representing lowest standards. 
Therefore, high values represent high customs burdens and lack of legal efficiency 
respectively. 
 
Global Competitiveness Report, 
World Economic Forum 
Domestic Bribe Bribing firm and receiving government official are from the same country.   
FCPA Firm has paid a bribe for a project in a foreign country and is subject to FCPA 
jurisdiction (U.S. firm or firm publicly listed in the U.S.). 





Firm has paid a bribe for a project in a foreign country, it belongs to a country that 
has signed the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, and the project was awarded after 





   
   
 
